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There is no Software, 
there are just Services: 
Introduction
Irina Kaldrack and Martina Leeker
Digital technologies permeate our daily lives. We access our social 
networks and the content we produce both individually and col­
laboratively, and other kinds of information from anywhere and 
everywhere. Along with the fusion of computers and telephones 
into smart, mobile devices, these practices are changing the con­
cept and the materiality of software. In the past, shrink­wrapped 
software, as it was called, had to be purchased, installed on a 
personal computer (PC), configured, and updated regularly. Today, 
however, it suffices to log on to a single platform and install a 
service to easily access Dropbox, Facebook, Google, etc. In parallel 
to the development of clouds, web services, and mobile apps on 
the consumer market, “classic” software providers are moving 
to subscription models in ever­greater numbers: Adobe Creative 
Suite becomes Adobe Creative Cloud and Microsoft Word 
becomes Office 365. Software is no longer purchased, but rather 
can be rented. The world of PCs, in which hardware is embodied 
in an object and the operating system (OS) allows the user to 
install and execute software, is being transformed. The hardware 
is getting smaller and diversifying into netbooks, laptops, mobiles 
10 and tablets. The possibilities for their use—formerly provided 
by software in bundled applications and graphical user inter-
faces (GUI)—are now designed in cascades of services. The user’s 
devices merely enable access to services that in turn, access 
spatially remote hardware and control processes.
This development within the consumer domain corresponds to 
a shift into Software as a Service (SaaS) for business. Accordingly, 
companies can lease IT­supported administration services for 
managing their employees, products, and customer data. Hence, 
hardware purchases are limited to Internet­enabled computers 
with access to a SaaS provider. There are no expenses to be paid 
in terms of servers or software, modifications or maintenance 
by in­house IT departments or external consultants. Instead, the 
company merely pays access fees. This saves companies money 
and time and allows them to concentrate on their core business, 
as the sales pitch goes, and to generate greater profits. Beyond 
that, promises are made regarding the services’ ease­of­use, 
since these business processes like “product ordering,” “delivery,” 
or “payment receipt” are displayed and can be combined with rel­
ative ease. This means there is no longer the need to have expert 
knowledge of programming to optimise IT resources to one’s own 
needs (see Neubert in this volume).
The publishers’ thesis, “There is no software, there are just 
services,” describes this situation as a radical break with the 
previous epoch: Hardware, once objectivized as a physical 
computer, is becoming distributed across different data centers 
and dissolving completely into infrastructures. And software, for 
its part, has to date, controlled the spacio­temporal materiality of 
hardware and offered up user interfaces, but it is dissolving in a 
cascade of services that organize access to data and its process­
ing. Ownership of software is thus becoming obsolete, replacing 
goods as property through service use. This “use­economy” 
is open to all and promises empowerment: With these new 
services, everyone has the potential to offer their skills and goods 
for sale or exchange, as well as reinventing existing services 
11through combination and modification. It is exactly this interplay 
between entrepreneurial services and the rising “participatory 
culture” that corresponds to a process in which any kind of aid or 
help, personal service or favor—our normal, everyday practices—
can be subjected to the law of the economical (see Lison in this 
volume).
The thesis and title of this this volume refers not only to a situ­
ation of historical upheaval, but it may also be understood as a 
confrontation with a significant systematic argument of media 
science. The reference is of course Friedrich Kittler’s claim that 
there is no software, but only hardware, because the technical 
operations occurring within the computers could be reduced to 
switches in the hardware, which are then merely made human 
readable by the software (1992). Lev Manovich provoked Kittler’s 
thesis with the technical historical diagnosis, “There is only 
software” (2013, 147ff.), since all media forms, from photography 
to painting, have meanwhile dissolved into software in the age 
of digitalization. To describe the contemporary signature of 
digital cultures as cascades of queries and operations that are 
structured by bandwidth and connection speeds (see Parikka 
in this volume) is less of a reference to a historical upheaval à la 
Manovich (2013). As a variation of and commentary on Kittler’s 
systematic argument, it is instead suggested here that there 
could very possibly be no such thing as stand­alone hardware 
either, because programs and hardware have always been linked 
as services (see Neubert in this volume). Following Thomas Haigh, 
one could go even further and say that hardware is part of a 
complex system, comprising programs, support, documentation, 
companies, distribution, engineers, and programmers, as well 
as learning processes and practices (2002, 2013). Hence, the 
following research hypothesis arises, referring to Kittler’s sys­
tematic argument: Where hardware is part of a system in which 
“services”—in the sense of negotiating the use and commod­
ification of distributable software among multiple actors—are 
crucial (Haigh 2013), it is not the technical conditions relating to 
12 hardware or software technologies that determine the situ­
ation, but rather politics and economies as well as practices and 
cooperative constellations (Erickson and Kelty in this volume; 
Gießmann and Schüttpelz 2015; Schmidt 2015).
The thesis, “There is no software, there are just services” is 
thus apodictic and inadmissibly simplified. Of course, there are 
products that are offered as software even in this age of services. 
Furthermore, it is yet to be seen whether a radical shift will take 
place from a software regime to the rule of services. But the 
pointed assertion is provocative in such a productive way that 
it practically forces the necessary detailed and sophisticated 
observation of contemporary developments in the context where 
services are ubiquitous, that it is likely to have a major stake in 
the configuration of digital cultures. With their contributions, 
the authors of this volume present this debate, which can be 
structured into the areas of technology, practices, and economy. 
Even if these different perspectives on services seem to overlap, 
each focus nevertheless yields specific results. In a history of 
technology informed by media and cultural studies, the inter­
play between software, services, and hardware becomes clear, 
quite contrary to the assertion that software does not (or no 
longer) exist (Neubert; Erickson and Kelty; Magee and Rossiter; 
Parikka). There have always been services, it is just that their 
use and emphasis has changed (Haigh 2002, 2013). The strong 
focus on practices (Fagerjord, Lison, Erickson and Kelty) as 
well as the economy (Lison, Magee and Rossiter, Parikka) each 
shows, in a different way, to what extent and with what con­
sequences services as business models permeate other social 
domains. Thus, this publication takes up positions found in 
software studies that examine how different forms of software 
are embedded into the contemporary world. Herein lie issues 
of how software shapes subjectivities, commonalities, and 
working forms and how it is modified by them (e.g., the online 
journal Computational Culture; Fuller 2008 and Chun 2006, 2011). 
By focusing on services and with a differentiated discussion of 
13the concept in the narrower as well as the figurative sense, this 
book provides initial orientation for researching services, as well 
as for effective interventions in a “services culture.” The focus 
on interventions follows from the supposition that the shift 
toward services could lead to its own form of governmentality. 
This calls for further investigation and is yet to be explored as a 
level of critique of service cultures. With this in mind, each of the 
following illustrations of the individual areas implies particular 
options for intervention. This book aims to deal with the 
phenomenon and research field outlines above, but by no means 
claims to be exhaustive. 
Technology
The contributions in this volume address the technological 
nature of services from a technical­historical viewpoint. From 
this perspective, the claim that an epochal upheaval is occurring 
in the transition from software to services invokes an immediate 
contradiction. As Christoph Neubert argues, what calls for 
investigation is in fact the relation between hardware, software, 
and services. This relation, namely, is negotiated anew for each 
specific historical point in time and against the backdrop of 
technological and economic developments. In this reconstruction, 
software appears to be an instable element that mediates 
between machine and business processes. The modularization 
and encapsulation of program functions and the blackboxing of 
those as services, interlocks technological continuities—from 
object-oriented to agile programming—with conceptual and dis­
cursive shifts. Seth Erickson and Christopher M. Kelty focus on 
this interlocking of change and stability. Their heuristic approach 
uses concepts from contemporary theory of evolution in order 
to identify “patterns of change and stasis, patterns that tend 
to preserve ancestry” (Erickson and Kelty, 42, quoting Wimsatt 
and Griesemer 2007, 283). Rather than insisting that abstract 
distinctions do exist between software and services, in the spirit 
of Bruno Latour, they ask in which “modes of existence” (2013) do 
14 different forms of software currently occur. Liam Magee and Ned 
Rossiter have selected the historical development of databases 
as a historical reference for their contribution. It becomes clear 
in their recreation, how technological innovation from relational 
and non-relational databases accompanies certain “politics of 
parameters,” which in turn correspond to the policies of the 
organization and knowledge production, regulation, and control. 
Jussi Parikka takes his cue from Virilio (1999 [a], 1999 [b]) and 
looks at the disruption and collapse of services, namely through 
denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. In this way, he clearly demon­
strates the technological conditions on which SaaS are based: 
bandwidths, transfer speeds, and the efficient management of 
traffic come to the fore and reveal how network policy application 
is involved.
These historical reconstructions point out the moments at which 
the technological conditions shape the transitions from software 
to services and their respective regimes. Thus, they signal pos­
sibilities for intervention within the interplay of technology, 
practices, political economy, and discursivations.
Practices 
Services exhibit a two­fold relation to practices. First, the 
technological procedures within the service architectures dictate 
ways of programming as well as communicative and economic 
transactions. Thus, the use of files changes, according to Erickson 
and Kelty (49f.), through the use of apps: These do not just con­
stitute the only access to one’s own content in the cloud, they 
also fuse files to users, accounts, and platforms at the same 
time. Second, user practices have a reciprocative impact on the 
technology. Andrew Lison thus describes how the subscription 
model of Adobe’s Creative Cloud makes the illegal cracking 
of licensed software, like Photoshop, practically impossible. 
This development seems to be a technical solution to prevent 
undesirable practices. 
15Anders Fagerjord shows how a differentiated picture of a 
technical culture of services can only be arrived at by looking at 
practices. He looks at the practices of app culture and exposes it 
as a part of services. The promise of the app industry that apps 
should be easy to program and use, as well as freely available, 
is quickly deconstructed, if one looks at the network of actors 
participating in app production. Contrary to the promises, a 
monopolization may be on the rise, as the economic policy of 
Apple demonstrates. These apps can only be programmed and 
used on Apple devices and are only available via the Apple App 
Store. Following actor­network theory (ANT), Fagerjord develops 
a model for analyzing how the combination of different actants 
and their interests can modify or even undermine the industry’s 
service infrastructure.
Focusing on the practices shows that and how these are designed 
as operations and operation chains and can thus become trans­
latable into services. By equating these, the productive moment 
in the interaction of a reciprocative influence of technology, 
economy, and practices disappears. This is what Lison and 
Fagerjord highlight to differentiate the software from the service 
culture. From Fagerjord’s refined analysis, based on ANT methods 
and insights, one could deduce degrees of freedoms, which could 
help users to defend themselves against being forced into uni­
formity inside the service regime and to interrupt the cascade of 
services. 
Political	Economy 
If one focuses on the economic and social effects of the transition 
from software to services, the promises of companies operating 
these applications disintegrate rather quickly—promises 
like freedom and efficient time management. Rather, a new 
paradigm becomes clear, one that is revealed to be a regime of 
an all­encompassing service policy (Magee and Rossiter) and 
service economy (Lison). Markus Krajewski has made important 
16 preliminary contributions to our understanding of why and how 
technical structures and practices can turn into overarching 
regimes (2010, 2014). In relation to the question of whether a 
regime could form a service economy, Krajewski shows that 
applying metaphors is an integral component of the history 
of distributed computing—which is what the “service principle” 
referred to here, was called until the 1970s (2014). Metaphors 
like service, server, client­server architecture, or desktop, are 
used in information technology to make abstract technologies 
accessible, according to Krajewski. He points out that in the 
process, however, the metaphors unleash their own medial 
and culture­technical power such that technical, economic, and 
practical development gets promoted via the conceptual horizon 
of the metaphors in which these technologies are packaged. The 
metaphoric use of services is consequently not at all innocent but 
rather a constructive factor of service economies. 
In their chapter, Magee and Rossiter point out that the 
orientation toward service above all entails a policy of control 
and regulation, which is not only focused on the organization of 
work but the whole environment itself, as the idea of smart cities 
demonstrates. The authors point out that since this regime of 
services goes hand in hand with the expansion of infrastructures 
that would style themselves as black boxes, it is difficult to 
arrive at a position outside the system. For Andrew Lison (67f.), 
services and infrastructures are becoming an ineluctable con­
dition of existence in digital cultures, where they lead us hitherto 
unknown forms of work, remuneration, and ways of living. Such 
an example is the service, TaskRabbit, where highly qualified 
freelancers offer their services over platforms, either to their 
neighborhood or on the global market; from design through 
picking up groceries to babysitting. Business with services is 
quick, self­organizing, and purportedly both the freelancers and 
customers are happy with it. According to Lison, the problem with 
this, however, is that the differences between various professions 
and forms of work (immaterial, material, social­affective) are 
17dissolving and being bundled into the radical economical impetus 
we euphemistically call the “exchange economy.” Lison tells us 
this means neither goods, values, nor economic interpersonal 
relations exist in this regime, but rather only business exchanges 
that are no longer explicitly declared as such, and omnipresent, 
never­ending services. Drawing on Lison’s argument, one could 
emphasize his diagnosis by saying both providers and customers 
become service slaves. 
Regarding the issue of how the service regime could be inter­
rupted, it becomes clear that attacks on services are not an 
option because they have long been integrated into the system. 
The denial­of­service attack is used by Jussi Parikka to demon­
strate the technical foundations of service network politics, which 
comprise server capacity, the protocols of data traffic as well as 
bandwidths and the distribution of connection speeds. Parikka 
suggests that users of services relinquish control over their 
businesses, communication, and identities, and thus fall prey to 
the unstable infrastructural conditions distributing the services 
as well as being victims of the diplomacy of approvals and 
blockages of services instead of pursuing politically­grounded 
and legitimate regulation. Parikka hones his assessment of the 
consequences into the thesis: “There are no services, there 
are just vouchers” for access to services. He suggests that it is 
thus conceivable that a regime of services for services is being 
established in which access to the latter must first be enabled 
and secured via the former.
Areas	of	Interest	for	Interventions 
In discussing the thesis “There is no software, there are just 
services,” the economic perspective offers a less­than­encour­
aging finding. Google and Salesforce.com partnered up in 2008 
with the slogan: “Put your office into the cloud!” (Salesforce.com 
2008). The aim was to create a profitable business model with 
apps and software for company collaboration—and it was to 
18 have been limited to this arena. However, this book claims that 
different service forms and technologies were indeed culminated 
into one service regime. This can be highlighted by posing the 
question: How can a business model and a corporate advertising 
slogan configure everyday digital matters as a regime of services 
and infrastructures, which furthermore gets promoted in self­
organization, as demonstrated by activities performed by the 
mass of freelancers who are fixated on the sharing economy (see 
Lison)? In turn, both Neubert’s and Erickson and Kelty’s analyses, 
which are informed by media and cultural studies, show that one 
can only partially speak of a paradigmatic break with traditional 
software politics and the rise of a service regime. This insight 
can aid, i. e., in breaking through discursively­, economically­, 
and praxiologically­generated service logics. Even a look at the 
practices in the action field of services reveals a space for inter­
ruption in the service regime where a pluralization of action 
instances can be described and thus suggests a relativation of the 
grand corporate promises of software as service (Fagerjord). 
The broad and coarsely grained thesis therefore opens a 
productive tension for scientific analysis, one that unfurls 
between thinking through the consequences of service­techno­
logics, and deconstructing service regime discourses and 
technologies. With this in mind, it is possible to develop methods 
for intervening in the services landscape, and to identify pos­
sibilities for counteraction. Looking at the various aspects of 
services this way becomes necessary due to the signs that eco­
nomic primacy is preparing to supersede the technical options as 
well as the practices that are not primarily economic and thereby 
to escalate into its own form of governmentality. The creation 
of such a governmentality may even be enabled by the users 
and constitute the services being conducted. The users may be 
invoking and organizing their own self­exploitation. All the while 
they are in control of their own self­determination and so­called 
participation as a policy of access to services at the technical and 
infrastructural levels.
19Thank you to our colleagues on the editorial board, Marcus Burk-
hardt and Andreas Kirchner from meson press, as well as our 
research student, Leon Kaiser.
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“The Tail on the Hard-
ware Dog”: Historical 
Articulations of 
Computing Machinery, 
Software, and Services
Christoph Neubert
The emergence of service-oriented business models 
in	the	computer	industry	over	the	last	15	years	is	
part of broader historical dynamics underlying the 
relations between hardware, software, and services. 
This	article	traces	the	changing	configurations	of	
this triad with a particular focus on the economic, 
technological, and social construction of “software” 
in exemplary contexts. The historical evidence opens 
analytical and critical perspectives on the current 
rearticulation of software in terms of “services.”
There is no software. It strikes one as a historical paradox that this 
claim, defended by Friedrich Kittler in the early 1990s with critical 
rigor against the ideology of human control over seemingly trans­
parent computer hardware (Kittler 1992, 1993, 2014), resonates 
with business models hailed by today’s computer industry under 
the labels of Software as a Service (SaaS) and Service-oriented 
Architecture (SOA). Taking this paradox seriously, I will consider 
the idea of an epochal transition from software to services 
pursued by the present volume under a broader historical 
perspective, starting with the observation that the distinction 
between hardware, software, and services does not lie in the 
nature of things, but is a product of complex historical processes. 
In essential respects, the current convergence of software and 
services reverses a historical development: The proposition 
that there is no software but only services describes a situation 
characteristic of the computer industry until the 1970s. The sup­
posed decline of software has thus to be evaluated in the light 
of the emergence and transformation of “software” as technical 
artifact, economic good, and social dispositive. Witnessing its 
disappearance, the question arises: How did software come into 
being in the first place?
Systems and Programs
In the context of computing, the first usage of the term “software” 
in print is ascribed to the statistics professor John W. Tukey 
in 1958 (Shapiro 2000). The word was probably coined earlier 
verbally and in working papers, perhaps by Paul Niquette in the 
1950s (Niquette 2006), or already in the late 1940s by the RAND 
mathematician Merrill Flood (Cerruzi 2003, 365, 372). However, 
according to the Oxford English Dictionary, the word “software” 
came into broader use not before the early 1960s, referring to 
the “body of system programs, including compilers and library 
routines, required for the operation of a particular computer 
and often provided by the manufacturer, as opposed to program 
material provided by a user for a specific task” (OED).
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[Fig. 1] “Tin Canned Software” (Cybermatics 1971).
As this description already suggests, the historical notion of 
software crucially differs from our present understanding in 
several respects (cf. Haigh 2012). In a narrower sense, the con­
cept comprised systems software such as operating systems, 
assembly systems, programming tools and compilers. In a wider 
sense, software was taken to include media such as punched 
cards and magnetic tapes, but also written documentation and 
even human activities such as system analysis or training. Being 
linked closely to computer hardware on the one side, and to all 
sorts of services on the other, software did not cover what we 
take as its essence today, namely applications. A second aspect 
distinguishing the historical from the present understanding is 
that software was not originally a commercial product: Operating 
systems (OS), utilities, and programming tools were provided 
free of charge by the hardware manufacturers, being considered 
part of general services a firm bought or rented together with 
a hardware installation. Programs for specific business tasks 
such as payroll, file systems, or accounting, on the other hand, 
24 were highly customized and usually written in­house by the data 
processing staff of the firms.
For a long time, software represented “only the tail on the hard­
ware dog” (Bender 1968, 243). Accordingly, the software industry 
emerging since the mid­1960s was marginal and provided 
programming services rather than standardized products. Even 
where programs were offered as “canned” solutions (Figure 1), 
the proposed deal included hardware infrastructure, training, 
and customization. First attempts to acquire programs that had 
been developed by individual firms and sell them on a license­
basis as packaged applications to other customers in the same 
business were not undertaken before the late 1960s, and with 
little success (Brown 2002; Head 2002). Even providing a cata­
logue of useful software solutions did not meet the customers’ 
needs or expectations (Welke 2002). The idea to pay for software, 
especially for standardized products that were not even adapted 
to a firm’s specific requirements, seemed to make no sense. The 
often cited “software crisis”of the 1960s manifested in scarcity 
of qualified personnel (Ensmenger 2010, 51ff.), but questions of 
structured product design and the Taylorization of coding labor 
in an emerging software industry did not become relevant before 
the 1970s. Indeed, the term software engineering in the sense of 
“the professional development, production, and management of 
system software” (OED) was first used in 1968 (Mahoney 2004).
Time Sharing
The bias towards services characteristic of the computing 
industry of the 1950s and 1960s was largely due to enormous 
hardware costs. Large mainframe and minicomputers rep­
resented expensive infrastructures that were supplied to cus­
tomers in terms of a “computer utility rhetoric.” Just as electricity 
consumers did not keep their own power plants, “it would be 
cheaper and more reliable for organizations to buy information 
processing from a service provider, rather than owning a 
25mainframe computer” (Campbell­Kelly and Garcia­Swartz 2007, 
752). The technology underlying this service model is known as 
time sharing. The concept of time sharing was developed in the 
late 1950s, mainly motivated by the aim to make efficient use of 
expensive mainframe computers by avoiding idle times. Time 
sharing refers to the (seemingly) simultaneous access of multiple 
users that are connected via terminals to a central computer, 
technically based on the flexible allocation of CPU­time to con­
current user processes. The first experimental implementation, 
the Compatible Time Sharing System (CTSS), was deployed at the 
MIT in 1961 on an IBM 709 computer, followed in 1963 by the 
CTSS II on an IBM 7094 that allowed access of 30 remote users 
(Auerbach 1973, 65). Further time sharing systems were devel­
oped in the following years for various platforms by IBM, by Bolt, 
Beranek, and Newman, and by General Electrics in cooperation 
with Dartmouth College.
Evolved in universities and research centers, the technology 
of time sharing translated readily into a business model. The 
first commercial provider, Adams Associates, appeared in 1963, 
followed by IBM in 1964 (Auerbach 1973, 65). Even with the advent 
of IBM’s System/360 in the same year, computing hardware 
remained expensive and installations time and resource con­
suming, so only larger administrations and firms could afford 
to rent or even buy the respective equipment and keep the 
required personnel. Many smaller companies outsourced their 
data processing activities and took recourse to the services of 
time sharing providers, who offered remote access over public or 
private data lines to computing infrastructure including hard­
ware, programming environments (e.g. for COBOL, FORTRAN, 
and BASIC), software packages, file storage, and print services. 
Customers typically rented the required terminal equipment and 
were charged for parameters such as CPU­time, connection time, 
and storage volume.
26 Unbundling
The emancipation of a dedicated software industry from the 
previous economy of hardware and services involved two 
major steps. The first step was the emergence of the enter­
prise software sector since the 1970s, which was accompanied 
by a variety of technological, economic, and social innovations, 
including the standardization of products, new business and 
marketing models, a changing mentality of customers, profes­
sionalization of programmers, the rise of software engineering 
and corresponding methods such as structured programming 
and the systematic reuse of code in terms of software libraries, 
the development of interpreters and compilers for high­level 
computer languages, and the introduction of affordable and 
compatible hardware systems such as the IBM S/360 series (cf. 
Johnson 2002; Goetz 2002a, 2002b).
The efforts it took to invent software as an economic good and 
product in its own right is impressively illustrated by the incidents 
that led IBM to give up the practice of bundling programs with 
hardware and services. On January 17, 1969, the U.S. Depart­
ment of Justice filed a suit against IBM, charging the company 
with monopolizing the general­purpose computer market; the 
bundling of services, software and machinery was taken to be 
anti­competitive and illegal. It took the Antitrust Division six years 
to bring the case to trial in 1975, and it lasted another six years 
before it was finally dropped in 1982, then considered to have 
been “without merit” (cf. Johnson 1982; Kirchner 1982). However, 
in preparation of one of the longest and costliest antitrust trials 
in history, some 30 billion pages of paperwork were provided. 
During the trial,
Some 2,500 depositions were taken in all, and IBM compiled 
and stored in special warehouses 66 million pages of 
evidence. At the lawsuit’s peak, more than 200 IBM lawyers 
were working on the case, on whom the company spent 
tens of millions of dollars annually. […] The parties called 
27974 witnesses […] and produced 104,400 pages of testimony. 
(Anthes 1989, 65)
While the case was negotiated, IBM issued internal directives sup­
pressing the description of programs as products: 
We should realize that discussing [applications] programs 
separate from the machines in advertising or presentations 
is inconsistent with our fundamental position that hardware 
and software including programs are an indivisible product 
[...]. (cited in Arnst 1977, 4)
On the other hand, IBM reacted very fast to the legal issues 
raised by the Justice Department. An “unbundling task force” 
had already been formed in 1966 in the context of introducing 
the S/360 series (cf. Grad 2002; Humphrey 2002), and on June 23, 
1969, IBM announced its decision to pursue separate pricing of 
hardware, software, and services. This date has been taken as the 
birth of the software industry or “Independence Day for software 
firms” (Gibson 1989, 6), though in retrospect, it is more likely that 
IBM’s decision was not the cause but rather a symptom or effect 
of an emerging business sector. In any case, the unbundling affair 
provides a striking impression of the complexities raised by the 
emancipation of software. 
Mass Markets and Pricing Models
After the quarrels in the enterprise sector during the 1960s and 
1970s, the second major step towards software as a product is 
linked to the growing impact of the personal computer (PC) since 
the 1980s, which opened a mass market for consumer software 
(cf. Campbell­Kelly 2001). The PC served as host for packaged 
software applications offered to customers in shrink-wrapped 
boxes, and this software in turn played an important role for the 
domestication of computer hardware, its integration into the 
environments of offices and private households. At the same 
time, the concepts of layered architecture and protocol stacks 
28 as formulated in the OSI­reference model allowed to establish 
basic standards for the interconnection of computers, initiating 
the transition of the terminal­mainframe logic of enterprise 
computing towards the client­server logic of intranets and the 
Internet. Networked computing and the WWW opened new 
software markets for client and server operating systems (Novell 
Netware, Microsoft NT), web browsers (Netscape, Microsoft), web 
publishing software (Macromedia, Adobe), and antivirus software 
(Symantec).
The Internet business soon blurred the distinction between the 
economic sectors of services, enterprise software, and consumer 
software in the reverse order of their historical appearance: 
mass­market vendors such as Microsoft entered the enterprise 
software business, and later both consumer and enterprise 
software vendors turned to services (cf. Campbell­Kelly and 
Garcia­Swartz 2007, 736f.). The Internet also enabled new forms 
of collaborative work on programs leading to the Open Source 
movement. The impact of Open Source and “free” software, in 
particular of Linux, together with other trends such as the rise 
of mobile media and gadgets, the crash of the Internet economy 
around 2000, and the increasing commoditization of hardware 
and proprietary software led to the decline of the software 
product paradigm established in the 1980s and to new strategies 
of value generation. One interesting development in this con­
text is the appliances model that returns to the idea of bundling 
proprietary software and hardware as a boxed product (Hein 
2007). Appliances in this sense include consumer products such 
as game consoles, mp3­players, navigation devices, and per­
sonal gadgets of all sorts, but also enterprise appliances such as 
routers, or dedicated equipment for e­mail and firewall services. 
Another strategy employs marketing platforms for non­software 
products such as music downloads or e­books, the streaming 
of multimedia content, the promotion of social and business 
services, or the bundling of “free” software with advertising. 
These changes indicate a general turn of the computer industry 
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downstream revenues and services. The remaining software 
vendors were accordingly driven towards new pricing models: 
Traditional product sales and license fees have declined, and 
product company revenues have shifted to services such as 
annual maintenance payments that entitle users to patches, 
minor upgrades, and often technical support. (Cusumano 
2008, 20). 
Besides payment for maintenance, the classic one­time up­front 
license fee has been replaced by subscription or pay­per­use 
models that ensure a constant revenue stream, even during 
economic downturns. Such pricing models have far reaching 
consequences for the planning, versioning, and maintenance 
of products (Olsen 2006). In particular, since the development 
of new software releases and upgrades is mainly motivated by 
marketing requirements “creating the illusion of a new product 
to justify the repeated resale of what is fundamentally the 
same good” (268), the subscription model eliminates the dis­
ruptive effects of release cycles. On the other hand, software 
subscription tends to generate a lock­in of customers, which is 
problematic especially for small firms and freelancers (see Leis­
tert 2013 on the example of current policies adopted by Adobe).
Architecture of the Cloud
Quite different from promoting subscription under the guise of 
a “service” is the idea to provide the functionality of software 
applications in terms of web services: Instead of deploying a 
copy of software to be installed and run on the customer’s site, 
the vendor hosts the software on his own servers and provides 
access via the Internet. This business model is highly dependent 
on technical factors such as network and server performance 
and thus leads to the more recent paradigm of cloud computing. 
According to the definition provided by the U.S. Department 
of Commerce’s National Institute of Standards and Technology 
30 (NIST), cloud computing comprises three levels of services (Mell 
and Grance 2011): Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) refers to the 
provision of computing resources (processing, storage, networks) 
that can be configured like on­site hardware and used by the 
customer to “run arbitrary software, which can include operating 
systems and applications” (3). The underlying virtual machinery is 
in turn running on a distributed cloud infrastructure with pooled 
resources. The model Platform as a Service (PaaS) refers to vir­
tual development environments that already include operating 
systems together with “programming languages, libraries, 
services, and tools supported by the provider” (2f.). SaaS, finally, 
represents the highest integration level of cloud computing. 
The customer here uses the functionality of services without 
managing any infrastructure on the levels of operating systems, 
development environments, or application software (cf. Gajbhiye 
and Shrivastva 2014; Crago and Walters 2015). 
Technically, the implementation of SaaS conforms to the frame­
work of Service­oriented Architecture (Laplante, Zhang and Voas 
2008). SOA extends the logic of object-oriented programming 
to commercial services, turning from algorithms and control 
structures to software components that are defined in terms of 
specific properties, functions, and interfaces; these components 
shall interact without central control in the context of distrib­
uted software systems. A web shop, for example, may invoke 
a number of services offered by different vendors, including 
database management, payment services, and logistical services, 
each in turn drawing on a number of subordinate services such 
as processing web forms, recommendation systems, or tracking 
options. These components are only loosely coupled, i.e. during 
an individual process, services are invoked on demand, their 
discovery, selection and binding being accomplished “on the fly” 
in a non­predictable way (cf. Turner, Budgen, and Brereton 2003; 
Gold et al. 2004). Activities in this context are no longer con­
ceived as traditional programming; central process metaphors 
31instead refer to aesthetic practices in the domains of music and 
dance—“composition,” “choreography,” and “orchestration.”
In economic terms, SOA and SaaS neatly integrate with the man­
agement of business processes. The composition of services 
is accomplished by specific software tools such as the Business 
Process Modeling Language (BPML), an XML­based standard which 
is supposed to provide an efficient translation between economic 
and computational workflow. BPML was later succeeded by the 
Business Process Execution Language for Web Services (WS­BPEL), 
developed mainly by IBM and Microsoft and elevated to an 
industry standard by the OASIS consortium (Organization for the 
Advancement of Structured Information Standards) (cf. Turner, 
Budgen, and Brereton 2003; Candan et al. 2009). In this context, 
software has not only ceased to be a product, it also no longer 
represents a tool employed to accomplish specific business tasks: 
rather, both domains seem to converge in fulfillment of the old 
cybernetic dream that business itself becomes a matter of pure 
programming (i.e. music and dance).
Hidden Environments
The historical sketch provided so far might contribute to our 
understanding of the current service orientation in several ways: 
First of all, it becomes evident that the boundaries between hard­
ware, software, and services, as well as the relations between 
the three domains, are fluid and subject to permanent his­
torical change in conceptual, technological, and economic terms. 
Second, while hardware on the one hand and services on the 
other, fit into the classical definition of economic goods and rep­
resent fairly stable concepts, the status of software has always 
been problematic. Since its value depends on configuration, cus­
tomization, maintenance, and training, software remains closely 
coupled to services. The emancipation of the shrink­wrapped 
box seems to represent a transitional phase, and even in the 
consumer market, complex and costly applications are replaced 
32 today by cheap apps that in many cases function as interfaces 
to remote services. Third, in economic terms, there is no clear­
cut distinction between products and services, which rather 
represent the endpoints of a continuum. Different business 
models may rely on different strategies to “servitize” products 
or to “productize” services (Cusumano 2008, 26). Taken together, 
there seem to be no simple linear trends, but circular or other 
dynamics that govern the relations between hardware, software, 
and services, on micro­ as well as on macroeconomic levels (cf. 
Cusumano 2003, 2008; Suarez, Cusumano, and Kahl 2013). Thus, 
the present boom of software and computer infrastructure as 
services can be regarded as a renaissance of essential aspects of 
the hardware and services computing economy of the 1950s and 
1960s.
After all, there is no software. Kittler’s speculative and hyperbolic 
dictum, formulated in the heyday of packaged bit boxes, was 
obviously inspired by personal experience with personal 
computers running Microsoft operating systems. But it was 
meant more generally, pointing to an inevitable strategic delusion 
rendering invisible the politics and power relations inscribed in 
hardware. Today, hardware and software retreat from the focus 
of “user experience” and are supposed to become part of the 
environment—the “cloud” as a kind of encompassing atmos­
pheric metaphor, or smaller spheres such as the city, the home, 
clothes, or the human body. Before Mark Weiser formulated 
the agenda of Ubiquitous Computing, the late Marshall McLuhan 
emphasized the environmental logic of media, drawing on the 
example of the motor car. McLuhan claimed that the medium is 
not the vehicle, but the infrastructure, which he further described 
as a “hidden environment of services” (McLuhan 2005, 242). Thus 
from the beginning, the concept of “service” links the economy 
to an ecology of media—a managed ecology, however, of the 
cybernetic type, which is tuned towards operational closure 
and blackboxing. In particular, while software promises flexible 
control over hardware in terms of algorithms, services stand 
33for the possibility of flexible control over algorithms in terms 
of functions. While software encapsulates hardware, services 
encapsulate both hard­ and software. In the era of services, both 
hardware and software are running in protected mode.
Coding Services
So what are the real political and ecological conditions of infra­
structures? What are the material and energetic resources of the 
cloud, how are they managed, where, and by whom? How are 
working conditions in software industries transformed by the 
service paradigm? As a case in point, we might consider methods 
such as Extreme Programming (XP) or Agile Programming (AP) 
(Beck 1999; Beck et al. 2001) that are historically and system­
atically linked to SOA and cloud computing (Guha and Al­Dabass 
2010; Baliyan and Kumar 2014). Following the requirement of 
high responsiveness to changing demands, traditional devel­
opment and production cycles are given up in favor of a general 
acceleration of workflow. The “agile” paradigm departs from 
central principles of structured programming and the factory 
model of software production, considering thorough planning 
and extensive documentation as harmful. The “Agile Manifesto” 
and related commentaries (Beck et al. 2001) read as a peculiar 
combination of working methods with moral values, yielding a 
work ethic tuned towards efficiency, productivity, and customer 
satisfaction. While emphasizing categories such as “individuality,” 
“freedom,” and “respect,” many of the recommended principles 
and methods are in fact reminiscent of the theory of “egoless 
programming” formulated in the late 1960s by Gerald Weinberg 
(Weinberg 1971, 47ff.; cf. Ensmenger 2010, 212–217).
For example, in smaller projects, all team members should be 
present in the same room, maintain permanent communication, 
and practice self­monitoring and mutual correction, which is 
encouraged especially by pair programming in XP. Tasks and 
roles are flexibly assigned and supposed to change, team 
34 members are brought into direct contact with customers in 
order to react immediately to their feedback. Programmers 
are not rewarded for individual skills and competences, but for 
personal involvement. Work is accomplished by the team as a 
collective subject. Hierarchies are as flat as possible, central con­
trol should be avoided. Thus, in many respects, agile and related 
programs amount to a convergence of coding technologies and 
technologies of the self (cf. Neubert 2016). And obviously, the 
economic ideas of choreography, object­oriented programming, 
neat cycles, binding on the fly, and flexible work flow, return 
on the level of programming practices. Like other parts of the 
service infrastructure, human programmers belong to a pool 
of resources that are disposable and responsive on demand. 
In agile methods, the cloud becomes self­referential. Not by 
coincidence, Human Capital Management (HCM) is one of the most 
profitable services. While structured programming was linked to 
a Taylorization of software engineering (Mahoney 2004), “agile” 
programming and related approaches represent a next step 
towards neo­liberal, perhaps even post­liberal methods of coding 
subjects.
After all, there surely is a lot of software. So we might have to 
adjust Kittler’s heuristics: There are no services.
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The Durability of 
Software
Seth Erickson and Christopher M. Kelty
Software is neither material nor immaterial but 
durable,	entrenched	and	scaffolded.	In	this	article	
we suggest that services and software should be 
understood through the diverse forms of durability 
and temporality they take. We borrow concepts from 
evolution and development, but with a critical eye 
towards the diagnosis of value(s) and the need for 
constant maintenance. We look at examples from 
diverse cases—infrastructural software, military 
software,	operating	systems	and	file	systems.
Our goal this week is the conversion of 
mushyware to firmware, to transmute our 
products from jello to crystals.  
(Alan J. Perlis in NATO, 138)
A Software Coelacanth
In April 2014, a 60 Minutes report made a brief splash when it 
revealed that the United States live nuclear weapons arsenals 
are using “antique” software and hardware, such as floppy disks, 
microfiche and radiograph data and software written in the 
1970s. The Internets mocked the hopelessly outdated technology; 
John Oliver’s studio audience for Last Week Tonight audibly gasped 
when he showed them the image of a missileer holding an 8­inch 
floppy disk. Oliver’s commentary: “Holy Shit! Those things barely 
look powerful enough to run Oregon Trail, much less earth­ending 
weaponry.” 
Many people accustomed to constant updates, rapid release 
cycles, beta­testing and automatic upgrades found the story 
shocking—viscerally so since it concerns the deadliest weapons 
on earth. The “silver lining,” as a Vice article put it, quoting Major 
General Jack Weinstein, was that “cyber engineers [who analyzed 
the network last year] found out that the system is extremely 
safe and extremely secure in the way it ’s developed” (Richmond 
2014). The dramatic tension is thus driven by something unstated 
(that newer technology is always safer, better, more efficient 
than old, legacy systems) in conflict with something intuitive (that 
it makes very good sense not to connect these weapons to the 
Internet). 
The software and hardware systems that run these 1970s era 
Minuteman launch control systems are a kind of technological 
41coelacanth: a living fossil. Isolated, highly engineered, rigorously 
(one hopes) maintained, but never upgraded or changed. Con­
trast this with what we might think of as the cichlids of con­
temporary software: mobile apps, games, websites, APIs and 
services that appear hourly, where updates are constant and the 
rate of extinction equally rapid.1 The rise of Software as a Service 
(SaaS), Service-oriented Architecture (SOA) or the cloud seems to 
suggest that a qualitative shift towards a kind of hyper­insta­
bility is taking place: instead of a stable program nothing but a 
temporary relationship of queries across interfaces and devices, 
rendering something that was immaterial even more airy and 
vaporous. It would seem to follow that our economy and culture 
are also becoming similarly cloudy—precarious, uncertain, dis­
tant, contracted.
The apparent transition—from software to services—raises a 
question: are they different? What is the difference, and how best 
is that difference described? On the one hand, one might assert 
that there is no difference at all because the concept of service 
was built into software from the very beginning. Indeed, before 
the word or the object software existed, there were programming 
services.2 Software had to be unbundled and productized to achieve 
a stability and singularity we colloquially attribute to things 
like Microsoft Word or Adobe Creative Suite. Whether it be the 
computer utility of the 1960s or the thin clients and netPCs of the 
1980s when Sun declared “the network is the computer,” services 
have been a constantly desired goal all along. On the other hand, 
services today appear quite different: the ease of reconfiguration, 
the openness of their accessibility, the standardization of their 
functioning, and the reliance on a data­center­as­computer 
model all seem to turn software, databases, archives, indeed 
1 Cichlids are common, rapidly diversifying fish, comprising between 2000 and 
3000 species, including things like Angelfish and Tilapia, and exhibiting a 
stunning diversity in morphology and behavior.
2 On software services see Campbell­Kelly and Garcia­Swartz (2011), Campbell­
Kelly (2009). Chun (2011) also makes this point. 
42 even whole companies into ephemeral conduits of information, 
query or control. Stable productized software disappears in place 
of unstable, contractual arrangements—Adobe Creative Suite 
becomes Adobe Creative Cloud, Microsoft Word becomes Office 
365—replete with a shift from a sense of ownership to one of 
servitude. 
But the desire to fix the difference between the two falls into an 
ontological trap—demanding that the difference between the 
two be an abstract one of properties and kinds (and rights) rather 
than one of temporality and use amongst humans. Software 
studies occasionally suffers from a philological fantasy that 
the conditions of operation of software are territorialized by 
programmability, rather than the programmability of software 
being terrorized by time. Software and service are thus an entan­
gled set of operations which are better viewed from the per­
spective of duration and temporality, and in particular that of an 
evolutionary frame, than from the perspective of code, conduit, 
circuit, network, or other aspects that privilege a spatiality or an 
intellectual abstraction that relies on spatiality to make sense of 
it.
So in between the coelacanth of the Minute­Man missile 
software, and the cichlids of the Apple App Store lies a whole 
range of software existing at different temporalities and 
with different levels of durability. An evolutionary approach 
makes sense here, but not simply in order to describe this 
diversification, but to critically analyze where and how value 
and values—novelty, most centrally, but also security, safety, 
freedom, health or risk—are structuring these temporalities. 
“Evolution is not just any change and stasis, but particular 
patterns of change and stasis, patterns that tend to preserve 
ancestry” (Wimsatt and Griesemer 2007, 283, emphasis added). 
We are far from alone in turning to the ideas of evolution­both 
those who create software and those who study it frequently 
do so. For instance, within the field of software engineering, the 
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maintenance.3 And so­called “artificial life” researchers have 
long fallen prey to the fantasy that because a program evolves 
it must be alive (Helmreich 1998; Riskin 2007). More recently, 
Lev Manovich, among others, has adopted a loose language of 
evolutionary theory—but only, he insists, as a metaphor—to 
explain change over time in the domain of media­production 
software (Manovich 2013). 
Our exploration of evolutionary theory is not metaphorical, but 
critical and analytic, viz. how to analyze populations of software 
differentially, and in order to diagnose the values, ideologies 
or cultural technologies at work in and through software. Our 
focus is not on code or the program, but on the population of 
software—as engineers might say, the installed base of software, 
which necessarily implies an ecology of users, designers, 
maintainers, as well as organizations and physical facilities that 
must be kept running: made durable. 
The durability of software is not an internal feature of a particular 
software program or service, nor a feature of an abstract 
programmability or mathematical facet, but instead a feature of 
its insertion into a social, economic and cultural field of intention 
and expectation where it becomes differently. The Minute­man 
silo stays stable for reasons that are different than the “sta­
bility” of the Linux kernel (which changes often, in the name of a 
stability that maintains an unknowable range of possible uses). 
3 See for example the Journal of Software Maintenance, so called until 2001, 
when it was renamed the Journal of Software Maintenance and Evolution, until 
2012, when it merged with Software Process and Improvement to become The 
Journal of Software: Process and Evolution. There are countless examples of 
the colloquial use of the term evolution in software engineering, but there 
are also more precise attempts to characterize software evolution, primarily 
as an analysis of the internal evolution, or ontogeny, of a program (facilitated 
by the technology of versioning control systems) such as Mens and Demeyer 
(2008). There is also a ubiquitous phylogenetic obsession amongst software 
programmers visible in the array of trees documenting the descent of 
different software, e.g. Lévénez’s Unix chart (2015).
44 The becoming of a service such as Facebook Connect is much 
different than the simple query API provided by the Oxford English 
Dictionary. Both are services, both depend on money and humans 
who care about them—but the dynamics of their evolution and 
stasis are much different from each other. 
Evolution therefore is not just a theory of change or duration—it 
is also about how aspects of the past are preserved differentially 
in different ecologies. Software does not evolve the same way 
everywhere—like life it is constantly diversifying. Recognizing 
variation, heterogeneity, and the preservation of the past in the 
present can serve an important analytical and critical function: to 
identify the values, ideologies and cultural technologies that keep 
some systems stable and slowly changing while demanding that 
others seem to change “at the speed of thought.”
Software is not immaterial—this much is clear to anyone who 
studies it. But nor is software a substance. The replacement of 
software by services, if such a replacement is actually occurring, 
may be interpreted less as an ontological or material shift, and 
more as a shift in the relationships of concurrency, dependency 
and durability—software too has “modes of existence” (Latour 
2013).
In this article we borrow two notions from developmental­
evolutionary theory in order to think about the patterns of 
change and stasis in software: generative entrenchment and 
scaffolding. Wimsatt and Griesemer use these terms in order 
to argue for a developmental understanding of cultural and 
biological evolution, as opposed to a strictly gene/meme centered 
(á la Dawkins) one or a “dual­inheritance model” (Richerson and 
Boyd 2005). This is felicitous given the concrete fact that software 
is always paired with the word development—though we ought to 
be careful distinguish a “developmental biology of software” from 
software development as an established methodology. We argue 
here that durability—perhaps even “enduring ephemerality” 
as Chun (2011, 167–173) calls it—is a result of robustness and 
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foundational or otherwise locked into a network of uses and 
expectations, signaled by maintenance—another key term in 
our analysis—and driven by particular cultural and economic 
value(s). Maintenance of software, as software professionals 
often recognize, is not quite the same as maintaining a bridge or 
freeway: it is not about wear and tear or the failure of particular 
bits of software. Rather it is about keeping software in synch with 
changes and dependencies made in other software and systems 
(Ensmenger 2014).
Layers,	Stacks,	Entrenchments,	Scaffolds	
In most engineering textbooks, information systems are layered 
into stacks—often a pyramid—with material, physical layers on 
the bottom and an increasing ephemerality as one ascends.4 
Such layers do exist, but they are hardly ever so clean. In fact, it 
can sometimes be harder, more expensive or more dangerous 
to change a bit of software than the hardware or the infra­
structure on which it is supposedly layered or stacked. Generative 
entrenchment is a real feature of developmental entanglements, 
one that generates innovations by virtue of the very necessity 
of the entangled part or function.5 How these entanglements 
came about is a not pre­ordained or mechanical: it is matter for 
historical research into the development of a project, the spread 
4 There are numerous meanings of the term stack in the history of software. 
Sometimes it refers to an abstract data type in a programming language 
(adding something to a memory stack); sometimes it refers to a layering of 
different technological features, as in a protocol stack; and a more recent, 
more colloquial usage (e.g. solution stack) includes the range of tools—
programming languages, package managers, database, libraries—that make 
up a particular web framework used for rapidly building and deploying 
apps in different contexts. What they share is the attempt to capture how 
software is always stacked, layered or interconnected in progress. No 
software is an island, etc.
5 Blanchette (2011) discusses the example of modularity ’s effects on cross-
layer innovation.
46 of software, the standards guiding them (or failing to), and the 
reliance on expectations about the future of other components 
in a system, and the values organized in lines of force around a 
given software system.
Scaffolding as a concept serves a related analytical purpose. 
In building, scaffolding is necessary but ultimately disappears 
when a structure is complete (thought it often reappears for 
maintenance). In developmental psychology, scaffolding happens 
when people provide boundaries within which others can learn 
and develop skills. As they repeat these skills, the boundaries 
become less necessary. In the process of software testing, 
something similar happens: tools representing these boundaries 
(use cases, testing suites, different software environments 
like browsers, or common failure scenarios) are constructed 
around the software to test how it responds—as it is revised and 
improved these testing systems are torn down and disappear. 
As the software stabilizes and becomes more robust, it becomes 
generatively entrenched amongst other software systems and 
tools. Something of this process is captured by the process 
known ubiquitously in software engineering by the name of boot-
strapping: the use of one software system to design or construct 
another that either supplements or replaces it. Similarly, beta 
testing might also be interpreted as using real users (or early 
adopters) as scaffolding.
The appeal to these developmental evolutionary concepts is 
not proposed simply in order to provide a description of pure 
dynamics, complex or simple. Rather, by identifying dynamics 
and patterns, we can show how the values and the logics 
operate: some entrenched software is maintained and some is 
not, and maintenance implies a set of values that require critical 
interpretation ( Jackson 2014; Orr 1996). Not all software is 
maintained because it is economically valuable—Minuteman III 
missile systems, for instance, or the software that runs a power 
grid. Failing to maintain it may have economic effects, but it is 
maintained primarily in virtue of other values: security, safety, 
47health, mobility, secrecy, etc.6 Even “archived” software must 
be maintained, and represents particular values: preservation, 
recovery, evidence (Kirschenbaum 2008).
Beyond Old and New
It should not come as a surprise that there is great diversity in the 
world of software. What is surprising is that we have no good way 
of taxonomizing it—or studying it—other than the language of 
old, outdated, or obsolete vs. “cutting edge” or new. The language 
of innovation privileges the linear and the incremental over the 
spread of diversity or the interaction of different temporalities. 
The supremacy of the value of novelty or innovation is a 
peculiarly modernist and Western notion: novelty at all costs! 
And it implies a similar and opposite mistake: to think of the old 
as similarly linear and incremental—as deposited, archived, for­
gotten and in need of constant renewal. In fact, the perspective 
of evolution demands a perception of newness everywhere 
and in many different forms that persist: the past is not super­
seded, but preserved, differentially and in response to a changing 
ecology (consisting of other things that are similarly new and old 
at the same time).
The key critical or analytic moment therefore is not the 
identification of the new, but the identification of a distinct 
population—a kind of curatorial maneuver—the drawing of 
boundaries around a set of instances of the same kind such that 
diversity and differentiation are made to appear. A few examples 
might indicate a different path for how to study software. 
To begin with: particular populations of operating systems (OS) are 
arguably the most entrenched—and most generative—aspect 
6 In fact, there is a relatively robust economic niche where “obsolete” 
software is maintained, e.g. The Logical Company (2015) which re­creates 
“hardware, software and diagnostic compatible” versions of DEC’s 1970s PDP 
computers, giving that software a new temporality and durability
48 of our software ecology. They come in many forms, from the 
consumer­focused iOS and Android mobile OS (which is on 
the order of 10 years old) to UNIX­derived operating systems 
(which are on the order of half a century old). Add to this the 
various populations that are in some ways both old and new. The 
OpenVMS and Alpha operating systems were originally designed 
in 1970s for DEC­VAX computers, but are still in use in old, new, 
updated, emulated and migrated forms; OpenVMS runs India 
Railways’ reservation system and the Paris Metro’s automated, 
driverless line 14.7 
Similarly, entrenched programming languages (COBOL and 
FORTRAN) were at the heart of the Y2K hysteria. Although the 
predicted apocalypse did not come, it did reveal the problem of 
maintaining software—both its costs, and the kinds of values 
(in this case, fear of apocalypse) that are necessary to disembed 
entrenched software. Military systems, public infrastructure, 
factory process control (SCADA) systems, all contain various 
forms of entrenchments and dependencies—some of which 
are revealed dramatically (e.g. the case of the Stuxnet virus), 
some of which are revealed only slowly through maintenance or 
breakdown.
Entrenchment and scaffolding can also make sense of the variety 
of basic tools in use by software programmers—from compilers 
like gcc to programming languages, libraries and their bindings. 
The latter—language bindings—are a good example of generative 
entrenchment. Libraries of commonly used code in an operating 
system are often written in particular languages, such as C, C++ 
or assembly, often to facilitate re­use, and sometimes to make 
code more efficient (an algorithm in C can be made to run much 
faster than one in Perl, for instance). But because these libraries 
are “entrenched” in the operating system, they “generate” the 
need for bindings: bits of code that access and sometimes 
7 See for example Hewlett­Packard Invent (2002) and Wikipedia contributors 
(2015).
49recompile a library for use with another programming language. 
Old technologies “scaffold” new ones: stories of programmers’ 
need to re­write a program in another language (whether for 
efficiency or elegance, or to access parts of an entrenched 
system) are everyday evidence of the scaffolding process. 
Indeed, in 2015, the range of new programming languages 
and frameworks for rapidly building and deploying software 
have created vast but fragile webs of entrenchment and inter­
dependency. Web programming frameworks like Drupal and 
Ruby on Rails are rapidly evolving—the underlying programming 
languages (e.g., Ruby and php) are relatively new, the frame­
works themselves are evolving as their developers refine their 
approaches to the web, and (perhaps most importantly) the 
individual modules and plugins for extending these frameworks 
lead to a kind of “dependency hell.” One commentator (Hartig 
2014) reflecting on this historical difference in software said 
“compiling a C program from more than 20 years ago is actually a 
lot easier than getting a Rails app from last year to work,” a clear 
indication, as evolutionary theory predicts, that innovations are 
abundant, but not necessarily advantageous. 
Some kinds of software are not generatively entrenched, even if 
they persist in time or remain durable. The Minuteman missile 
base is an example—no other software or hardware depends on 
the software created to control those missile launch facilities, but 
it is nonetheless durably maintained as a closed system.
Other software is maintained because it is entrenched—both 
technically and culturally. Take for instance the whole system 
of software that makes an abstraction of a file possible: file 
systems, memory allocation, attributes and permissions, and 
directory hierarchies. As the authors of a Microsoft Technical 
Report (Harper et al. 2011) point out, the concept of file as a unit 
of data with associated attributes (e.g., ownership, permis­
sions) and canonical actions (copy, edit, delete) has proven to be 
remarkably robust, changing little over the last forty years. Most 
50 operating systems are built around files, which manage allocation 
of memory and access to data; pipes and files were central to 
the design of UNIX, which treats everything as a file, including 
external devices like printers (accessed through device files). 
Humans are also built around files: we expect them to function 
in particular ways, to be stable and findable, to be ownable and 
sharable. 
Although the file is a seemingly essential concept, it is challenged 
by service oriented computing or cloud computing where a new 
kind of “social” data is associated with files, and where files exist 
simultaneously on multiple devices. In this case it is not so much 
a particular piece of software code, but an essential “abstraction” 
(and an implied set of interoperable components) that is 
entrenched both in the hardware, and in the expectations of 
users. It is generative because the file cannot simply be replaced 
in toto, but rather must be “piecewise” re­engineered, guided by 
particular values.
Blanchette’s example (2011) of the Google File System dem­
onstrates that even if the file is not what it used to be, we 
still need the abstraction as a way to get the file to appear 
manipulable and stable on a set of virtualized servers (preserving 
it, and further entrenching it). Engineers might agree that there 
are “better” ways to do things, but the file cannot be so easily dis­
embedded from both human and machine consciousness. 
But: it is changing. Scaffolding can help us see how. iOS and 
Android operating systems both “hide” files from users. They are 
not yet gone—the OS still relies on them—but are embedded 
inside an app which has very quickly become the primary mode 
of interacting with software on most devices (Apple 2014). It is 
very hard to “open a file” on a phone or iPad, because the system 
is designed to hide files and metadata about files inside an app—
which is now intended to be the primary abstraction for humans. 
For most purposes, however, apps do not require users to open 
or close important files, and they solve the question of “where is 
51my stuff?” by putting it inside the app (and “in the cloud”). This 
creates a kind of scaffold whereby users can change from an 
understanding of apps that open files, to one where apps have 
data and resources tied to users, accounts and devices. Some 
populations change faster than others.
This transition, however, is not simply an evolutionary fact. 
Rather, by understanding the generative entrenchment and 
scaffolding of files and apps, we can turn a more critical eye on 
what are otherwise simply dubbed technological or engineering 
concerns. Among other things, the file abstraction supports a 
particular model of property rights in which digital objects are 
literally designed around stable property ownership: files must 
have owners and permissions. Apps, by contrast, are designed 
around a different field of rights and laws: contracts and terms of 
service—specifically non­negotiable contracts in which the app 
provider has significantly more rights than the app user.
This is the “cultural technique” at the heart of the transition 
from software to services: 20th century intellectual property 
rights law was designed for intangible property fixed in “tangible 
media” and the myriad ways in which media was so fixed in the 
era of Film, Gramophone, Typewriter (Kittler 2006). Contract law, 
by contrast is not about a relationship between the intangible 
and the tangible, it is about the fixed duration of a relationship 
of trust, and a way of structuring the future in terms of liability 
and responsibility. It is not an either/or situation, but as more and 
more users enter into contracts, instead of purchasing property, 
the software itself changes to support this cultural practice.
Apodosis: Legacy
The word legacy is one with a precise meaning in the history of 
information technology. Legacy systems are every IT manager’s 
bogeyman; they are the cause of lock-in they are the emblem of 
the evils of proprietary software; they are the cause of Y2K bugs 
and the scourge of cyber­security, they represent the evils of 
52 corporate capitalism, the domination against which free software 
and Open Source are often pitched in battle.
But if evolution is “particular patterns of change and stasis 
that preserve ancestry” then there is no way out of a legacy. 
Not all legacies are equally momentous, however, just as not 
all inheritances are equally large. We would do well to develop 
a better understanding of how ancestry has been and is pre­
served in software systems, if we want to make any claim that 
innovations like SaaS actually represent some break with the 
past. On the contrary—some services will become entrenched; 
the seemingly flexible solution stack of today is the legacy system 
of tomorrow. Even more importantly, there is no single legacy, 
but a pattern of differences: a diversification with respect to 
environment. And if we want to analyze the difference these 
differences make, we must move away from treating software as 
substance—whether material substance or thought substance: 
program, code, algorithm.
Actor Network Theory makes a simple point here: we do not live 
in a world with humans as the foundation, nor in one simply run 
by the automaticities of machines, but in a world of relations and 
modes. The difference that software makes depends on how it is 
inserted into the relations amongst our associations—but it is not 
inserted the same way everywhere. The effect of software—the 
difference it makes—depends on the “patterns of change and 
stasis which preserve ancestry” at play in any given case.
Thinking in terms of scaffolding and generative entrench­
ment might be an antidote to the relentless anti­humanist 
teleology so common in both popular and scholarly thinking. 
That teleology—a kind of neo­Spencerianism—is driven by 
punditry and criticism that demands of software (and technology 
generally) that it obey a law of ever­complexifying, ever­accel­
erating progress towards either the domination of some 
imagined all­powerful capitalism or the liberation­destruction 
53of some fantasized autonomous artificial intelligence.8 This 
Refrain of Constantly Accelerating Change contains a grain of 
truth—software has enabled new patterns, new durabilities—but 
it misses the existence of diversity in the world, and the ways in 
which it preserves ancestry. To view software evolution as an 
institutionally and culturally heterogeneous object might allow us 
to critically diagnose its real effects, rather than running ahead to 
the next new thing in order to declare its sudden dominance, and 
the irrelevance of all the rest.
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From Shrink Wrap to 
Services: The Universal 
Machine and Universal 
Exchange
Andrew Lison
The shift within digital media from software to 
services represents a level of ubiquity above and 
beyond that of multimedia, the digital’s relation of 
previously-existing forms of media within its binary 
system of equivalence, and into the relation of social 
relations themselves. In this sense, it both mirrors 
and complements the global spread of capitalism, 
which also seeks to make both goods and relations 
equivalent (but not equal) through the money form. 
Tracing this shift, this chapter examines connections 
between the development of end-user Software as a 
Service and the service economy enabled by mobile 
apps like Uber and TaskRabbit to argue that “service” 
in this context should be understood as the universal 
medium’s extraction of value from the increasingly 
universalized process of exchange.
Information is the key commodity in the 
organizational logic of protocological control. 
(Galloway and Thacker 2007, 57)
The digital is a totalizing force. The history of its development 
as medium, which is equally the history of its development as 
concept, is the progressive subsumption of previously existing 
methods, media, and, eventually, relations into fundamentally 
binary logics of (re)production and transmission. Thus, when 
Friedrich Kittler asserts that “There is no Software,” he does so 
in order to highlight the capabilities (and, ultimately, limitations) 
of Turing’s universal machine, wherein the potential for this sub­
sumption resides, as opposed to any individual program, which 
can only represent a particular instance of it (Kittler 1995). Cap­
ital, too, effects a similar totalization, rendering human relations 
as much as the goods they produce comprehensible through 
a logic of universal exchange, one that simultaneously and 
paradoxically implies both equality (all social transactions can be 
made equivalent, for they can be effected by conversion into the 
money form) and inequality (one side of the transaction—that of 
the capitalist—nevertheless accrues more value than the other). 
If software is the mechanism by which specific processes and 
media become interchangeable aspects of the universal machine, 
then globalization is the process by which individual regions, 
peoples, and labor practices are incorporated within a worldwide 
system of capitalist political economy. Thus, significant work con­
sidering the encounter between a globalizing capitalist tendency 
and regional particularity notwithstanding (e.g. Tsing 2005), 
analyses of capitalism as a totalizing force remain key to fully 
accounting for both its power and drive.
The question thus arises of the relation between the digital and 
global or late capitalism, as Marxist thinkers have often termed 
it (e.g. Mandel 1978, Jameson 1991). It has been a foundational 
59tenet of Marxist epistemology that, contrary to the way I 
have described it above, universal exchange has served to 
obscure human relations rather than—or, to be more precise, 
simultaneously instead of and in addition to—rendering them 
into a system of equivalence. Thus, the critique of the commodity 
form laid out in the opening of Capital and, hence, the many sub­
sequent attempts to lift, provisionally and in advance of a really­
existing communist society, the “veil…from the countenance 
of the social life­process” (Marx 1976, 173) by way of demys­
tificatory analysis and, subsequently, avant­garde Verfremdung, 
the latter being the very technique that, as Lev Manovich has 
argued, graphical digital interfaces ultimately defang by fully 
incorporating (Manovich 2001, 306–307). Yet the rise of graphical 
user interfaces (GUI) in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and espe­
cially the multimedia software that accompanied them, situates 
software at a paradoxical nexus in that the critique it renders 
toothless is outlasted by the very form it was meant to critique. 
This form is not so much capitalism itself as it is its specifically 
commoditized manifestation, which reaches its apotheosis in the 
shrink-wrapped software package and, in doing so, also outlasts—
if only just barely—the really­existing “communist” societies of 
Eastern Europe.
To say that the commodity peaks with the advent of the shrink­
wrapped software package is not to say that shrink­wrapped 
software somehow represents the ideal, Platonic commodity. 
Rather, it is to assert that shrink­wrapped software indicates 
the final moments of a political economy fundamentally pred­
icated upon the commodity form, that is, one in which nearly all 
socio­economic relations, even those primarily effected through 
medium­agnostic “informational” products, are masked through 
the circulation of material goods. The view of modern media 
as essentially a function of technological reproducibility has 
been in play at least since Walter Benjamin’s analysis (Benjamin 
1968), if not the advent of movable type itself, but the anti­
nomies between a commodity in which a fixed amount of labor 
60 is invested and one in which an initial, extensive outlay of labor 
is subsequently amortized over large numbers of comparatively 
inexpensive copies is stretched to its breaking point in shrink­
wrapped multimedia software.1 At the root of these contra­
dictions lies the question of whether consumers are purchasing 
an object to do with as they please (including copying whatever 
content it may contain), or a license to the content contained 
within the object, to which they are subsequently subject to 
restrictions.2 The question of licensing becomes crucial precisely 
at the moment that media are no longer confined to the objects 
in which the industrial production process has enshrined them 
but become effortlessly reproducible, which is to say subject 
to piracy (Kittler 1995). Already the lesson of 1980s campaigns 
like the British Phonographic Industry’s (BPI) “Home Taping is 
Killing Music,” in the case of digital multimedia so­called intellec­
tual commodities become reproducible without so much as the 
degradation of quality induced by analog reproduction. Con­
sequently, the BPI campaign was followed shortly thereafter by 
both a cavalcade of digitally­enabled sampladelia in the popular 
music of the late 1980s and a renewed focus on copyright law 
within the industry (see, for example, Clover 2009, 25–50). 
Shrink­wrapped software represents the apotheosis of the 
commodity form because, without the deliberate addition of 
1 This problematic is not easily reducible to the classical Marxist distinction 
between fixed and variable capital in that components of the culture/media 
industry’s creative process, in pre­networked times, were (and still often 
are) generally not themselves able to be commoditized as easily (if at all) 
as its output was. Thus, “creative” costs (storytellers, directors, musicians, 
programmers, etc.) remain to a large extent variable; one cannot (yet?) 
purchase a scripting machine at fixed cost and thereby make professional 
screenwriters obsolete, although one can now “crowdsource” them.
2 It is of course imperative to consider this question in relation to the music 
industry’s own shift to digital media with the compact disc in the early 1980s, 
a shift predicated upon convincing consumers to repurchase their favorite 
recordings as new media commodities and most decidedly not characterized 
in terms of any kind of “media upgrade license” affording those who already 
owned them on vinyl or cassette the right to experience them on a new 
format. See also Sterne (2012), 219.
61“copy protection,” it is the first commodity that can be exactingly 
yet painlessly copied by end­users on a massive scale and thus, 
in a sense, the last. This is a problem analyzed by Kittler from 
the perspective of what might still barely be called production, 
or software development: the impossibility of claiming ownership 
of a universally computable algorithm that must be overcome in 
order to ground the rise of software as commodity (Kittler 1995).3 
On the side of what might equally as tenuously still be described 
as consumption, that of the end­user, consider instead in this 
regard The Software Publishers Association’s (SPA) infamous 
1992 “Don’t Copy That Floppy” video, which tellingly highlights 
3 For Kittler, software compilation enables universally computable algorithms 
to become obscured and thus property, a process which he productively 
but erroneously equates with mathematical encryption: “The ever­growing 
hierarchy of high­level programming languages works exactly the same 
way as one­way functions in recent mathematical cryptography…For 
software, this cryptographic effect offers a convenient way to bypass 
the fact that by virtue of Turing’s proof the concept of mental property 
as applied to algorithms has become meaningless…Every license, every 
dongle, every trademark…prove[s] the functionality of one­way functions” 
(Kittler 1995). In actuality, the distinction between the two is key: decoding 
a message encrypted with a sufficiently advanced “one­way” algorithm, 
while so computationally intensive as to remain infeasible without the 
key with which it has been encrypted, nevertheless produces an exact 
replica of the encoded message when performed successfully; there is no 
such guarantee with decompilation. Although crucial for the reification of 
software into a commodity, compilation might be more accurately anal­
ogized to a kind of lossy compression. To put it another way, decompilation 
is properly undecidable, with only a partial reconstruction existing in the 
complexity class NP­complete (Horspool and Marovac 1980, 223, 227), while 
by contrast full decryption of a “one­way” ciphertext without the key is, 
at best, as Kittler describes, NP­complete. (What Claude Shannon defines 
as a “Perfect Secrecy” system, however, would be properly undecidable 
because the number of possible decryptions would equal the number of 
possible plaintext messages (Shannon 1949, 659). Such a system carries 
the difficult requirement of a truly random key, pre­shared between the 
sender and receiver, of equal or greater informational value (e.g., length) 
to the message to be encrypted; contemporary digital encryption systems 
generally trade this undecidable perfection for smaller amounts of entropy 
(i.e., manageable key length), reusability, and the possibility of public, yet 
reasonably secure, key exchange).
62 the issue of software piracy through a musical form then at the 
height of its popularity, hip­hop.
The video begins with two schoolchildren debating whether 
to copy a game in order to take it home and continue playing 
when “DP,“ a rapping “disk protector,“ appears on their computer 
screen to discourage them. Citing the economic costs of copying 
software, DP, played by actor and lawyer M.E. Hart, explicitly con­
nects the software industry to the retail store:
One leads to another then ten then more  
and no one buys any disks from the store  
so no one gets paid and they can’t make more  
the posse breaks up and that closes the stores.  
(SPA/M.E. Hart 1992)
Indeed, the video seems to suggest that software is inseparable 
from the physical medium in which it is inscribed:
The more you take the less there will be  
the disks become fewer, the games fall away 
the screen starts to shrink and then it will fade 
programs fall through a black hole in space 
the computer world becomes bleak and stark 
loses its life and the screen goes dark.
Welcome to the end of the computer age.  
(SPA/M.E. Hart 1992) 
The “computer age” here is unthinkable not simply without a 
material support (an observation unremarkable to the point of 
obviousness) but without a very specific material support, the 
floppy disk, and the system of economic relations—again not 
simply capitalism but a specific system of commodity distribution 
and retail sales—that enables it. Yet the video itself not only 
seems aware of the uphill battle it faces in convincing computer­
savvy kids not to pirate software (at one point it even seemingly 
admits that it is often trivial to do so), it relies on the very features 
of iterability whose deployment it seeks to curtail in its audience. 
63Hip­hop, of course, as Joshua Clover has noted, is perhaps the 
popular musical genre most closely associated with sampling and 
appropriation (Clover 2011, especially 89–90; see also Clover 2009, 
25–50), and the video’s musical backing track is accompanied 
by stock graphics that are cycled through by applying various 
changing color palettes in a veritable tour de force of the era’s 
multimedia production standards. Indeed, one wonders to what 
extent the video and its soundtrack are composed out of fully 
licensed (or license­free) sources, or rather if its makers might 
instead perhaps claim fair use for at least some of the sam­
pled drums and/or visual motifs it incorporates. Regardless, the 
video’s existence is ultimately inseparable from the techniques of 
reproduction it decries, as digital logics of reproducibility are the 
cultural legacy to which producers and consumers alike are heir 
in the age of multimedia, which is perhaps why the focus here is 
less on the legal ramifications of piracy than its supposed eco­
nomic and, ultimately, moral consequences.
To say that the commodity peaks with the advent of the shrink­
wrapped software package is also to say that from there it goes 
into decline. Software, and software “publishing” specifically, 
does begin to disappear as the SPA predicted, but not as it 
feared. Screens do, in fact, begin to shrink and even fade as 
mobile devices and the embedded components that will make 
up the Internet of Things come to be the dominant computing 
platforms of the early 21st century, and programs themselves do 
seem to fall through a black hole as the commoditized software 
package is increasingly replaced with the Software as a Service 
(SaaS) paradigm. SaaS is generally conceived as a back­end 
phenomenon, powering platforms like Amazon Web Services 
and Microsoft Azure, on which other companies’ software 
applications can run without the need for them to maintain a 
physical server infrastructure. Even more so, the term is used to 
describe a paradigm for constructing made­to­order applications, 
business processes, or workflows out of individual, constit­
uent parts as, for example, with the widely popular Salesforce.
64 com, whose phone number is in fact listed on their website 
as 1­800­NO­SOFTWARE. Yet, today, with the retail software 
store practically nonexistent and the floppy itself a media­
archeological relic, it is worth considering the ways in which the 
service paradigm has subsumed even shrink­wrapped end­user 
software.
In January 2015, for example, following its success in rebranding 
Office, arguably its most valuable software product, as a sub­
scription service with Office 365, Microsoft announced that its 
forthcoming operating system, Windows 10, would be available 
under similar terms: 
We think of Windows as a Service – in fact, one could 
reasonably think of Windows in the next couple of years as 
one of the largest Internet services on the planet. (Meyerson 
2015) 
One could view this move in terms of the software giant playing 
catch­up to Apple, which has offered upgrades to its iOS mobile 
operating system free to those with a valid mobile carrier con­
tract since the release of the original iPhone in 2007 and free 
upgrades to its desktop OS X operating system since 2013. Unlike 
the latter company, however, which could be said to take a 
more Kittlerian approach, subsidizing its OS development costs 
through the sale of hardware, Microsoft, which licenses Windows 
to third­party hardware manufacturers and thus relies directly on 
software sales for revenue, explicitly evokes the service paradigm 
as a justification for this transition. Where once new operating 
systems, most notably Windows 95, were met with customers 
queuing up to be the first to walk out the door with a boxed 
copy, the Windows as a Service paradigm suggests that even the 
software most fundamental to the operation of our personal 
computers is now considered something akin to infrastructure, 
maintained under contract rather than delivered as standalone 
product.
65Free and Open Source software (F/OSS) has often been 
championed as a response to the shrink­wrapped commodity 
model, but the interventions that made it a powerful alternative 
to proprietary software have thus far proven largely inef­
fective in addressing the specific inequalities perpetuated by 
the expansion of capital via SaaS. Many of the requirements 
of the venerable GPL (GNU General Public License), such as the 
requirement to publicly offer source code (including any mod­
ifications made), do not apply to those running such software 
on a server that only presents the output of its computations to 
the end­user via the network, leaving these stipulations to the 
compatible, but less popular AGPL (GNU Affero General Public 
License, see GNU Operating System 2015). Exceptions like this 
allow “cloud” companies, including major tech players like Google 
and Apple, to take advantage of free software while maintaining 
the proprietary nature of their online services. Indeed, legal 
measures like the AGPL can only partially ameliorate this situ­
ation. GNU founder Richard Stallman describes the conundrum in 
terms of Service as a Software Substitute (SaaSS):
[I]f the programs on the server are free that doesn’t protect 
the server’s users from the effects of SaaSS…SaaSS always 
subjects you to the power of the server operator, and the 
only remedy is, Don’t use SaaSS! (Stallman 2010, emphases in 
original)
The service paradigm can thus be seen as supplanting not only 
commodity, but free software ideology as well.
Perhaps even more strikingly, Adobe Systems’ 2013 move to 
a “Creative Cloud” infrastructure for its suite of multimedia 
software including Photoshop, Flash, and Illustrator replaces 
the shrink wrap model with a subscription service for the very 
group of “creative professionals” whose jobs, at least until the 
financial crisis of 2008, were seemingly one of the few bright 
spots in an otherwise bleak global economy. If, as Lori Emerson 
has argued, Apple has made of “creativity” something of a 
66 fetish, obscuring the very lack of creativity it fosters upon users 
through its increasingly closed software and hardware inter­
faces (Emerson 2014, 18­19), the Creative Cloud paradigm and 
its corresponding mobile apps suggest that even that limited 
amount of imagination is now only available on loan from major 
multinational corporations. Viewed in comparison with the 
origins of Photoshop, one of the Creative Cloud’s (and, indeed, 
Adobe’s) flagship products, the “Creativity as a Service” paradigm 
tracks the ongoing reduction of the so­called “creative class” 
(Florida 2002) to bonded laborers. Developed in the late 1980s 
and debuting as a 1.0 product in 1990, where it quickly became 
a cornerstone of the digital multimedia revolution, Photoshop 
is arguably the software product most responsible for the 
ascendance of this class in the first place: on a website recently 
constructed to celebrate the program’s 25th anniversary, 
Hungarian artist and photographer Flora Borsi writes, 
When I was a young girl, I didn’t have the money to organize 
shoots in a studio, so I created whatever I wanted in Photo­
shop. Thank you, Adobe, for giving me the tools and oppor­
tunity to build my career. (Adobe 2015)
Yet, in a Reddit Ask Me Anything with Photoshop co­creator 
Thomas Knoll scheduled as part of this celebration, one 
particular thread (amongst a handful of other mentions of the 
topic) remarked upon how crucial the role of piracy had been in 
developing children, who usually could not afford the famously 
expensive software, into paying adult professional users. User 
mkautzm writes,
It ’s very indirect and it’s definitely playing the long game, 
but if you can get teenagers invested in your product before 
it ’s actually time to make a purchasing decision either for a 
business or for personal use, I think that’s extremely sus­
tainable and profitable for a business…This is hugely at odds 
with the Adobe Cloud. (Reddit 2015)
67As a method of shifting away from a commodity model that also 
carries with it the added benefit of being more closely able to 
contain piracy, SaaS, especially when extended into end­user 
software like Windows and Photoshop, offers an example of 
Thomas Piketty’s much­celebrated analysis describing how a 
rentier economy flourishes when r, the rate of capital return, 
exceeds g, the rate of economic growth (Piketty 2014, 25–27 and 
422–424), shifted into the “immaterial,” digital realm. Correlative 
with a decline in career development and upward mobility, 
commercial software providers, rather than relying upon those 
who pirate a shrink­wrapped copy to develop into legitimate 
owners of subsequent major versions when they become 
financially and professionally solvent, now prefer to lease them 
as “services” to all users on a monthly or yearly basis in exchange 
for precarious, ever­revocable access to a steady stream of 
incremental updates.
Services in fact occupy something of a contradictory place in 
Piketty’s analysis in that they simultaneously account, at least in 
Western economies, for the largest sector of economic growth 
over the past 200 years—one primarily based upon raw human 
labor such that “an hour’s work of the typical wage­earner in the 
twenty­first century can buy just as many haircuts as an hour’s 
work a hundred years ago” (Piketty 2014, 90)—yet, at the same 
time, one that contains “the lowest paid workers” (Piketty 2014, 
280). In fact, he argues that services have become so dominant 
and such a catchall term that 
[i]t would probably be more perspicuous to group activities 
in terms of their ultimate purpose (health, transport, 
housing, etc.) and give up on the distinction agriculture/
industry/services. (Piketty 2014, 589, n. 17) 
In much the same way that nearly all media are now digital, 
nearly everything is now a service, so the need to specifically 
identify them as such is superfluous; this is an expansion of auto­
nomist Marxists Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s assertion 
68 that what they call “immaterial labor has become hegemonic 
in qualitative terms” (Hardt and Negri 2004, 109, emphasis in 
original). The service sector, for them, is a subset of immaterial 
labor, which also includes logical and semantic practices such 
as programming, but in a SaaS economy, these distinctions are 
rapidly vanishing. With mobile applications like Uber, Airbnb, 
and TaskRabbit connecting contractually­independent drivers, 
part­time landlords (or sublessors), and contingent workers with 
paying customers, software becomes the means for the sup­
posed “disintermediation” of buyers from sellers in an immaterial 
labor market more accurately defined in terms of service than 
“sharing.”4 With companies like Elance­oDesk and OnForce, this 
regime is extended to developers as the “Everything as a Service” 
model incorporates even the creation of software services 
themselves (DCR TrendLine 2014).
If the autonomist hope was that the qualitative hegemony of 
immaterial labor offered a turn away from the mystification of 
the commodity form and towards Marx’s “social life­process” 
not through the disenchantments of the avant­garde but via 
the expanding multitude that capital attempts to subject to this 
potentially more self­evident regime of labor, then the (return 
of the) service economy in software, as the qualitative and 
quantitative expansion of an already­existing contingent labor 
force, represents capital’s full­throated response to these con­
ditions.5 Services do make more apparent the social networks 
4 On apps like Uber and Airbnb the provider is rated as much if not more 
than the amenities “shared.” An Uber driver is not so much “sharing” her or 
his car as they are chauffeuring someone somewhere; in order to ensure a 
favorable rating on the site, an Airbnb “host” often, if not always, provides 
a variety of services (cleaning, cooking, potentially even companionship) 
above and beyond the strict “sharing” of lodging with his or her “guests.”
5 It is important to note that the mainframe era of computing offered its own 
version of SaaS with companies like IBM complementing the sale or rental 
of their massive and costly hardware with development consulting services. 
The current SaaS model is thus in a sense both a return to and an expansion 
of this concept whereby it is extended from the enterprise to the population 
at large. For more on the multitude, see Hardt and Negri (2004).
69that constitute labor relations, but they do so while taking an 
invisible, yet hefty cut. Indeed, this is Piketty’s point when he 
highlights the absurdity inherent in the president of the European 
Central Bank’s campaign against “rents”:
What the central banker had in mind, apparently, was lack of 
competition in the service sector: taxi drivers, hairdressers, 
and the like were presumably making too much money. The 
problem posed by this use of the word ‘rent’ is very simple: 
the fact that capital yields income, which in accordance with 
the original meaning of the word we refer to…as ‘annual rent 
produced by capital,’ has absolutely nothing to do with the 
problem of imperfect competition or monopoly. (Piketty 
2014, 423)
Capital, in other words, extracts rent regardless of the licensed 
professions it seeks to disrupt in the name of “efficiency,” and 
software­enabled service economy companies like the taxi­sup­
planting Uber are nothing more than the way it does so at their 
expense. Thus, if it seems that, in a sense, there is no (longer any) 
software, it is not through its reduction to the pure potential of 
the universal machine, but by way of its hypostatization into the 
agent of universal economic exchange, the ultimate mediator of 
social relations and the ultimate aim of globalization. Similarly, 
when everything becomes a service, humanity can no longer be 
considered to be approaching a common existence as unalien­
ated beings marshaling the free potentia of our collective labor; 
rather, everyone becomes a serf. Just as information security 
analyst Graham Cluley has suggested, echoing Stallman, that we 
ought to replace the word “cloud” with the phrase “somebody 
else’s computer” (Palmer 2013), when we hear the word “service” 
we should instead think “somebody else’s property,” a deniable 
reality as long as we still had a chance of convincing ourselves 
that it was we who had ownership over the contents of a box, 
rather than the other way ’round.
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Service Orientations: 
Data, Institutions, Labor
Liam Magee and Ned Rossiter
Our central interest in this essay is to consider the 
role of the database as a technology of governance 
and the scramble of power as it relates to a capacity 
to	model	the	world	and	exert	influence	upon	it.	
We argue Software as a Service is more than a new 
vogue term of the IT industry, constituting a longer 
temporal horizon and more complex rearrangement 
of relations between data and labor to which the 
database and its entailments remain critical.
Arguably the relational database has had greater impact on the 
transformation of organizational cultures and the world economy 
than the Internet. The analytic potential of computational 
databases coupled with the materiality of data centers has 
produced models of this world without historical precedent. Key 
here is the question of scale and the ubiquity of data capture. The 
structuring of data has a genealogy. The knowledge once derived 
from the transitional technologies of cabinets of curiosities 
(Wunderkammer), demographic registries and Foucault’s  “great 
tables” in the 17th and 18th centuries—later systematized 
into various epistemic instruments that included Diderot’s 
encyclopaedia, the periodic table, the museum and Linnaeus’ 
taxonomies—were all coincident with the rise of populations 
governed as statistical subjects. The Cartesian grid, a two­
dimensional space for organization and arrangement, provided 
an abstract template for subsequent techniques to employ in the 
structuring and querying of data. Such instruments can today 
be understood as proto­databases, foreshadowing what Gernot 
Böhme has called our present era of “invasive technification“ 
(Böhme 2012).
Critique and judgement become hoodwinked by the seemingly 
irrefutable authority of statistics and visualizations of the incom­
prehensible. Decisions are made on the basis of a misrecognition 
between data and the material world. Cognition is now out­
sourced to the machine. Leibniz’s dream of a mathesis universalis 
becomes in this incarnation a nightmarish inversion—from being 
at the center of the modern epistemological enterprise, humans 
are now peripheral data collectors and, increasingly, just data. 
Structurally oblivious to their function in the reproduction of 
value within an economy of data, the human has entered a new 
period of machinic arrangement whose operation is abstracted 
into the realm of semiotic capitalism (Lazzarato 2014). An 
imaginary of cooperation, sharing and participation provides a 
powerful narrative for the entrepreneurial­self whose capacity to 
organize collective forms of refusal is consistently undermined by 
75the disaggregating effects of value extraction derived from the 
computational logic of recombination hidden within the vaults of 
algorithmic architectures (Scholz 2014; Terranova 2014).
The advent of the relational database in the early seventies marks 
a critical transition in the ductility and malleability of knowledge 
of people and populations. Edgar Codd, an IBM employee, first 
introduced the relational model as an alternative to existing net­
work and hierarchical database systems. The relational database 
differs by formalizing the relationships between the logical 
elements contained in distinct sets; one of its advantageous 
effects was to separate the operations of manipulating and 
querying data from its physical location on hard drives (Codd 
1970). The cost and time involved in changing how programs work 
with data is accordingly reduced. The interrogation of subjects 
soon after becomes literalised with the advent of the Structured 
English Query Language, or SEQUEL (and later SQL), in a paper 
by Chamberlin and Boyce, also IBM employees, in 1974. Already 
the human subject is captured in specific “relations” of labor and 
commodities. Chamberlain and Boyce's very first example con­
sists of a “relation describing employees,” featuring the barely 
fictional cast of familiar surnames: “Jones,” “Smith” and “Lee” 
(1974, 250). A further example of query references equally familiar 
brands: “Find those items which are supplied by Levi and sold 
in the men’s department” (253). These examples also betray the 
spatial and cultural centers of the fledgling IT industry.
With the advent of the relational model and SQL, information 
becomes in a new sense purely programmable as data and 
available for, among other things, forms of ad hoc knowledge 
production. It opens up entirely new scientific fields of infor­
matics. Data mining, business intelligence, real­time analytics, 
customer relationship management (CRM) and enterprise 
resource planning (ERP) are unthinkable without the modern 
database. This in turn has led to a technological shift in the 
processing and logistical operations of modern institutions, 
with transformative effects in the apparently mundane fields of 
76 report writing, insurance assessment, credit checks and policy 
development. What were once specialized arts become template­
driven and eminently replicable institutional processes.
Here, knowledge rubs up against the politics of parameters. New 
uses of data became a constant in the social life of institutional 
settings, laden with a politics that remains for the most part 
implicit as it is pervasive. As Codd noted presciently, though 
without apparent concern for its political implications, “future 
users of large data banks must be protected from having to 
know how the data is organized in the machine” (Codd 1970, 377). 
Implied here is a system operating in “protected mode,” a form of 
prophylactic for organizers of the data as well as for those “future 
users” at risk of going crazy (Kittler 2013). As Friedrich Kittler 
observes, the power of the protected mode is “derived … from the 
efficacy of silence” (Kittler 2013, 213). Unable to intervene in the 
operating system (OS) of the machine, the user is locked out from 
issuing commands that alter the architecture and addressable 
memory special to the real mode of Intel’s x86 central processing 
unit (CPU) introduced in 1978. Intel’s 80286 16­bit microprocessor, 
released in 1982, distinguished between real mode and protected 
mode, a CPU designed for multitasking applications operating 
in real­time secured by increased operating system control.1  
Modern operating systems, Windows, MacOS and Linux, continue 
to use this mode to protect us from our machines, in some sense, 
even today.
The widespread adoption of protected mode systems impacts 
upon the economy of expression, practice, subjectivity and 
knowledge. In one of his rare moments of invoking a concept 
of power, Kittler suggests that the Foucauldian analysis be 
reoriented around an investigation of how protected modes 
1 Kittler’s object of critique is the 80386 32­bit microprocessor released in 
1985, which improved upon the protected mode of the 80286 by allowing 
mode­switching. The 80386 also had greater market penetration and was 
widely adopted across a range of institutional settings.
77specific to technological systems and their “privileges” provide 
the key to reconstructing the transformation of bureaucracies. 
While not renowned for political statements, Kittler considers the 
issue of access rights as, in effect, the new front of a geopolitical 
war against the hegemony of the United States and the imperial 
extension of its IT industry across global economy and society.
One might reasonably assert that Open Source software (OSS) 
offers such an alternative to protected mode. But for the most 
part, OSS mimics if not aspires to the aesthetic regime of the 
hugely dominant operating systems. Do­it­yourself (DIY) hard­
ware assembly might offer a more deviant alternative, though 
even moreso than OSS it is unable to scale up to pose any real 
challenge to the IT behemoths. The DIY hardware movement 
is increasingly tied to maker culture, which as the long­tail 
of “artisan­alternatives” is not prepared to admit how the 
valorization of localism frequently depends on global supply 
chains (Wark 2013). Virtuous acts of rarefied consumption 
coupled with the satisfaction of self­assembly fulfill a hipster 
imaginary of distinction, an inner­city latte variation on IKEA. 
Just as the imaginary itself is part of a global media production, 
reverberating from one trendy alleyway to another, its desires are 
serviced through the concealed operations of the world logistical 
economy.
The OSS and maker cultures encompass a spectrum from “com­
plicit” corporate­backed organizations (for example, the Apache 
Software Foundation) through to iconoclasts and hacktivists who 
offer some scope for critical kick­back. While the OSS movement 
in general shares an obvious alignment with the call by Kittler 
(and many others) for forms of open access, or real mode, this 
does not disqualify the scepticism we register here. Even the 
most idealistic of projects can become entangled in corporatism. 
MySQL is a widely used database system, a “poster child” of the 
OSS movement and the default for many other OSS projects, 
including the popular blogging engine WordPress. In 2008 the 
Swedish firm that hosted and supported MySQL was sold to Sun 
78 Microsystems, which in turn was soon after acquired by Oracle, 
the largest vendor of enterprise database systems in the world. 
It continues to be supported by Oracle as a means of “upselling” 
users to its more expensive suite of products. In protest, one of 
the founders of MySQL then launched a Save MySQL campaign 
(Wikipedia contributors 2015).
The durability of knowledge practices was and continues to 
be coextensive with the persistence of parameters. Political 
existence contracts into the embodiment of Quine’s dictum: to be 
is to be the value of a variable. Manuel DeLanda has, in another 
context, reflected explicitly upon the conceptual individuation of 
the assemblage through a process of parametrizing, or “providing 
it with ‘knobs’ with modifiable settings the values of which 
determine the condition of the identity of an emergent whole 
at any given time” (DeLanda 2011, 187). Just as contemporary 
philosophy is tempted, then, to think entire ontologies, including 
social systems, through the affordances of database logics, the 
operations of modern institutional life and labor are equally 
determined by processes of parametric adjustment, tuning and 
tweaking. Changing these values—the settings of parameters—
alters the configuration of thought and practice.
By the early 1980s the increasing reliance of all institutions on 
the parametric affordances of the database reinforces and 
reinflects late twentieth century theories of institutionalism. 
For Max Weber, operating under earlier assumptions about the 
institution, it appeared as a necessarily constrained artefact of 
capitalist modernity, a comparatively inflexible and non­con­
figurable organizational form without parameters (Weber 1930). 
In announcing “new institutionalism,” Paul DiMaggio and Walter 
Powell revisited this “iron cage of bureaucracy,” reconceiving the 
modern institutional form as instead an “isomorphic” entity with 
shared common procedures, structures and operational norms 
which at the same time could be capable of adaptation to geo­
graphic, commercial and industry­specific conditions (DiMaggio 
and Powell 1983). We argue this isomorphism or “elective affinity” 
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at particular conjunctures is recognizable by new institutionalist 
theorists in part due to its historical coincidence with the ubiquity 
and relatively enduring quality of the enterprise database. In the 
same way, the onset of flexible modes of capital accumulation 
was not a transformation independent of emergent devel­
opments in computational architectures. The logistical world 
of what Anna Tsing (2009) terms “supply chain capitalism” has 
become increasingly governed largely by the dual and intercon­
nected processes of real­time computationality and just­in­time 
modes of production and distribution. The agility of the modern 
institution is, then, contingent upon the combinatory possibilities 
of relational databases that operate at ever increasing scales.
Since the 2000s the capacity for institutions to adapt to regimes 
of flexibilization is augmented, rather than replaced, by novel 
non­relational systems. So­called NoSQL, or non-relational 
databases, appear to relax the constraints imposed by the 
relational model. Seemingly new paradigms of data man­
agement add further layers of what Codd had termed “protective” 
indirection between users and the physical allocation of zeroes 
and ones on magnetic or solid state hard drives. Two particular 
IT terms resonate here: SaaS, or Software as a Service, and SOA, 
or Service-oriented Architecture. The first term, SaaS, refers to the 
delivery of software as a series of features, or services, over a 
network rather than as an executable file that installs and runs 
from a computer’s hard disk. The second, SOA, describes instead 
a way of developing software to expose critical functions, again 
as services, over a network for use by other software. Databases 
do not disappear in these frameworks. Rather, they are trans­
formed into services provided to other systems, other services 
and part of a larger combinatory puzzle through which clients, 
both machinic and human, have their informatic demands met. 
In theory, organizations providing such computational services 
are interchangeable. In practice, IT language such as standards 
compliance, consumer choice and the ability to plug­and­play 
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entrenchment that pays lip service to flexibility. Choice is seen 
through the prism of constrained parameters. This logic refracts 
the insular world of IT fashions and policies to the larger fields 
of institutional labor and politics, increasingly dependent upon 
these apparent abstractions of informational architectures.
Part of the flexibility of what Stefano Harney and Fred Moten 
term the “algorithmic institution” tasked with the management 
of “logistical populations” is immanent to the technical operation 
of enterprise databases such as Oracle and IBM, which are prone 
to bugs, hardware malfunctions, software glitches and the like 
(Harney and Moten 2013, 90–91; Harney 2014). Yet the logistical 
fantasy of a smooth world of seamless interoperability is not 
disturbed by technical malfunctions alone. As Harney and Moten 
write:
Every attempt by logistics to dispel strategy, to banish 
human time, to connect without going through the subject, 
to subject without handling things, resists something that 
is already resisting it, namely the resistance that founds 
modern logistics. (Harney and Moten 2013, 91–92)
Logistics is always troubled by that which it cannot obtain, by the 
indeterminate temporal and spatial horizons and hidden reserves 
of human subjectivity that forever entice the technocratic 
tendency with the promise enhanced measures of efficiency, 
yet which by definition remain beyond the calibrating optic of 
logistics. This is why so much cognitive attention and so many 
financial resources are expended upon designing more complex 
computational infrastructures.
“The Service Orientation”
In the first decades of the relational database, it was possible 
to imagine this tool of bureaucratic enlargement through the 
metaphor of the physical container. Sitting in air­conditioned 
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palpable link between the logical and the physical. Databases 
ran on big iron mainframes or industrial­strength PCs capable 
of fast input/output operations, low disk and network latency, 
and high transactional throughput and parallelism. Data had a 
home; it could be secured, locked down, contained within the 
appropriately named data center. Deeply nested behind non­
descript suburban office exteriors and warehouses, technicians 
and administrators, with talents that were obscure even to 
the broader IT industry, kept the machines and data systems 
humming. Yet the prospect of fully automated labor was never far 
from the machine dreams surrounding the database. Robots took 
over the swapping of back­up tapes; self­replicating and load­
balancing databases reduced the need for human monitoring.
This is not so much a story of manufacturing and low­wage 
jobs offshored to developing economies; such features can also 
be found in the majority of advanced economies. Rather, the 
integration of multiple layers of value­generating activities is 
made coincident as a result of technologies of governance such 
as the relational database. Labor becomes increasingly sub­
ject to the logistical regime of real­time coordination, command 
and control. In an inversion of the processes of software and 
database design techniques used to simulate “real world” objects 
such as the “customer” or the “employee,” pace Chamberlin and 
Boyce (1974), these labor entities begin to resemble more and 
more the data structures of enterprise resource planning and 
human resource (HR) systems they are supposedly modeled upon 
(Rossiter 2015).
Beginning in the nineties, but maturing with the arrival in the 
mid­2000s of fully­fledged virtualized or cloud services such 
as Amazon Web Services and EC2 (Elastic Compute Cloud), 
Microsoft’s Azure platform and Google’s App Engine, SOAs pose 
a radically alternative computing paradigm. At the same time this 
paradigm looks to extends Codd’s desire to “protect” users still 
further. Housed on highly virtualized farms of servers in data 
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What matters under this paradigm is no longer the specific con­
figuration of technical data structures to physical hard drives and 
machines, but rather the relations, tuples, lists, sets, sequences, 
keys and tables peculiar to the processing of data. Indeed, the 
modern database administrator, including the humble maintainer 
of WordPress websites, is less and less likely to understand how 
these relations are configured at all. Rather, the database exists, 
increasingly, as a kind of implied contract to supply its clients with 
a range of data services, delivered over networks using various 
standardized protocols that include SOAP (Simple Object Access 
Protocol) or REST (Representational State Transfer).
The database is no longer a container, a tangible housing or 
repository. Instead, it is service oriented: the passive object of a 
sentence, that which is responsive to requests. From the point 
of view of the demanding client, it is no longer relevant whether 
these service requests are resolved by a tightly coordinated 
cluster of processes running on the same processor, or instead, 
and increasingly, by a loosely federated web of interconnected 
services. In effect, this means the architecture is never ques­
tioned. Any plea for change or deeper level access is met with 
resounding indifference by the proprietors of control. The 
function of the client is to submit to service. Such a technique of 
capture provides the basis for scalar expansion. One may choose 
to migrate to other providers, but the time and cost associated 
with adapting organizational processes and activities to slightly 
reconfigured architectures is significant. So no matter how 
much a client may wish to flee service­oriented systems, the 
operational indebtedness to a particular architecture more often 
exceeds the will to escape. In spite of the rhetoric of standards 
compliance and migration pathways, in practice user “protection” 
risks becoming pacification.
The devolution of computing to the shapelessness of the cloud 
is one of the IT industry’s recurring motifs. Even if it is not 
inevitable, there is nonetheless a danger in exaggerating the 
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processes. Already by 1984 it was plausible to market the idea 
that “the network is the computer” (Olsen 2008; Aytes 2012). Sim­
ilarly, in 2015, it is also possible to argue that the compelling story 
of reified services, both in the purely computational sense of SOA 
and in the economic derivation of SaaS and its near­cognates, 
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) and Platform as a Service (PaaS), 
has long since subsided into the background noise of general IT 
hardware and software commoditization. These technologies 
have reached their point of design stasis, what in Gartner’s jargon 
would be termed the “plateau of productivity.”
Yet the terminology of computing services suggests a more 
meaningful turn, a re­orientation is underway. Through the prism 
of the new computing service industries—which include not only 
the outsourcing of hardware, software and network capacity, 
but also quasi­human services such as system monitoring and 
back­up, fault detection and data analytics—it is possible to 
imagine a highly compressed history of capitalism replayed at 
a rapidly accelerated velocity. It is as though computing, having 
earlier exorcised its primary and secondary industry moments, is 
today running headlong into its post­industrial epoch—an event 
heralded for capitalism at large only in the 1970s. Aping the age 
of corporatism, of endless outsourcing, offshoring, vertical and 
horizontal integration, mergers, acquisitions and divestments of 
non­core assets, the rise of the global SOA effaces as meaning­
less the authority of the singular, coherent software system or 
repository of data. The tangible data product—a hard drive, a 
floppy disk, a memory stick—is now fully transformed into an 
etherealized thing, an intangible commodity, an abstract service, 
often performed either algorithmically or supported via data 
entry by nimble fingers or server maintenance from bodies in 
spaces remote to the sites of consumption.
The newly formed fabric of SaaS represents, then, the realization 
of a particular logic of procedural alienation—a realization in 
which both the computational time of processing cycles and 
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tinctiveness. In this model, “Software as a Product” disappears. 
So too does the appealing cottage industry of eighties share­
ware culture, swap meets, and the then­fledgling Open Source 
movement, where at least the programmer’s authorship and rep­
utation could be tied—however superficially, and now, with some 
sense of nostalgia—to an identifiable artefact or commodity. In 
its place comes a grey world of interconnected service endpoints, 
undifferentiated, integrated and distinguished only by IP 
addresses and a coded declaration of their capabilities.
This architectural model has its political analogue in the rise of 
microwork, exemplified by another Amazon site: the Mechanical 
Turk (MT). 2 Here, for the remaining low­value services algorithms 
cannot quite yet accommodate, and which need therefore to 
be especially qualified as Human Intelligence Tasks (or HITs), 
it is possible to buy and sell human labor at piece­meal rates. 
The original eighteenth century Turk represented a machine 
that dissembled the rules specific to its operation, all the while 
being driven by human labor. The Amazon “refresh” suggests 
a new possibility: human labor now fills in the gaps for those 
cases where algorithms are insufficient. Tasks include identifying 
duplicate Facebook and Google+ accounts, labelling materials of 
objects in photographs and deciphering handwriting (Limer 2014). 
This form of service orientation is, today, a fortunately esoteric 
form of soliciting labor. Yet the close approximation in language 
and function between Amazon’s EC2 and Mechanical Turk—both 
promote the flexibility of “elastic” resources—offers a glimpse 
of a degree of “invasive technification” that exceeds the gloomy 
predictions of Böhme. The algorithmic possibilities of the service­
oriented institution are similarly elastic: they continue to stretch 
and expand across a range of human occupations, a process of 
2 A number of participants also addressed MT at the Conference Digital Labor: 
Sweatshops, Picket Lines, Barricades, The New School, 2014.
85labor automation decried since the seventeenth century (see 
Hobsbawm 1952).
Moving into the twenty­first century, it is not so much the 
threat of obsolescence as the disappearance of boundaries and 
responsibilities that, paradoxically, is presaged by the rise of the 
SOA­led institutions. It becomes increasingly difficult to see in 
the current orientation towards services how from the point of 
view of the service consumer certain forms of monotonous and 
metric­laden human labor can be differentiated any longer from 
those performed by computers. The work of Business Process 
Outsourcing (BPO) has become a staple economy across much 
of the IT sector in India. Servicing the needs of data entry in the 
medical, insurance, logistical and finance sectors for both large 
multi­national companies and Small and Medium Enterprises 
(SMEs), BPO work is secure as long as wages remain suppressed. 
Like the circuit board that never tires, BPO work and its affective 
correlate found in call centers is 24/7 both offer a form of  
“sensory impoverishment” that dulls perception and dissipates 
any reserves of energy that might be harnessed into forms of 
labor organizing (Crary 2013, 33, 105).
The Ethereal Database, or, Black Box Politics
If the relational database represents the institutional transition 
to a computational form of modernism, where paper records 
were replaced by tuples identified by a primary key and assem­
bled into new kinds of “great tables,” then now we are arguably 
entering into an era of the hypermodern. When information loses 
its anchorage in physical analogues of filing and record keeping 
systems and succumbs to a new set of dissolvent metaphorical 
clusters—of cloud computing, agile methods, mobile devices, 
virtual machines and an elasticity of resource provisioning 
(computational or human)—it loses its last vestiges of tangibility. 
Adopting Lewis Mumford’s metaphor of technology, it can be said 
to have become “etherealized” (Mumford 1938). For Mumford, 
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information “’etherealized’ through the city into durable elements 
in the human heritage” (Mumford 1938, 3, emphasis added). In a 
quite different sense, the information space once occupied by the 
relational database can similarly be thought of as something in a 
hybrid state: simultaneously dissolving, becoming elusive, trans­
parent, ethereal and also gathering in insulated and protective 
layers, unknowable, a machinic servant receiving inputs and 
responding with outputs. The black box is at once opaque and 
utterly transparent.
While “vaporware” indicates software that is so soft that it in fact 
does nothing, or does not exist, we can imagine an alternative 
coinage in which the metaphors of ether and vapor infuse with 
that of a new term like cloud computing. But it is not only the 
ethereal quality of data management that concerns us here. Such 
attributes are, as we have suggested, part of the hype machine 
special to the IT industry and its services. Database records still 
need to be inscribed as zeroes and ones on magnetic or solid 
state discs, which are usually located in largely inaccessible data 
centers. What becomes difficult to think here is the simultaneous 
properties of ethereal transparency and material opacity that 
attend the new data services. The commercial enclosure of 
communications infrastructure coupled with the opacity of 
algorithmic architectures special to SaaS gives rise to a politics of 
the black box.
For the data­dependent enterprise this signals, in the first 
instance, a calculable trade­off between direct control and 
efficiencies and economies of scale. By shearing off its 
dependency on “big iron” mainframe computing to service 
providers while continuing to transact in “big data,” the modern 
institution simultaneously divests yet another no­longer­core 
activity—managing its own data—while insinuating itself 
yet further into the unstable set of relations that cut across 
old institutional lines. Here, the term “architecture,” always 
metaphorically overladen when applied to software, is instead 
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network of loosely coordinated endpoints, refracting service 
requests and responses from point to point. The possibility for 
error is accordingly amplified; the responsibility for that error 
lost, along with any single locus of control over computational 
results. If, as Jaron Lanier recently suggested, “the distinction 
between a corporation and an algorithm is fading,” under 
the distributed scenarios of a fully realized SOA/SaaS digital 
economy even the “algorithm” is no longer singular nor self­con­
tained (Brockman 2014). With the rise of smart cities one finds 
an increasing feedback operation in which “all that is solid” 
modulates forms of algorithmic governance and vice­versa. 
Adaptation and transformation is a mutually constitutive process 
contained, retrieved and acted upon within the parameters of the 
database that is now oriented towards an architecture of service 
delivery. The SOA database would be a crude approximation to 
this concept of data that is no longer “based” anywhere.
In the broad advent of the SOA/SaaS digital economy any 
organization can avail itself of “elastic” data facilities at seemingly 
any scale. Any organization can make use of predictive analytics, 
business intelligence and a host of ancillary services for data 
authentication, search, logging, billing, monitoring, visualization, 
conversion, publication and backup. And while these services 
may be offered in limited variety, by a limited range of vendors, 
any organization can also differentiate itself through the large 
combinatory possibilities that an even seemingly small number 
of parameters provides. The relational database ushered in new 
forms of predictive and just­in­time data analytics through the 
ability to develop ad hoc queries and reports, thereby allowing 
modern institutions simultaneously to become homogenized 
as a general form while differentiated in parametric specificity. 
The SOA database accelerates both sets of tendencies towards 
institutional similitude and differentiation. Like the limitless 
possibilities a finite set of rules provides in the game of chess, 
the SOA database offers an infinitude of institutional forms to 
88 emerge within the horizon of its parameters. Similarly, it fur­
ther accelerates the condition and precarity of service­oriented 
labor, setting new “standards” for how capital is flexibly accu­
mulated and deployed. But where such institutional variation 
does occur, it is not reducible to the determining form of the 
database. Culture leaks beyond the structural constraints of 
data parameters. At the same time the processes of structural 
decoupling and disaggregation we describe above also introduce 
new prospects for self­cannibalization, creative destruction and 
systemic intervention. How to operate outside such limits and 
invent new systems of organization and cultures of expression 
will comprise a parametric politics of the present.
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  MOBILE APPS  
  APPLE  
  APP STORE  
  CLOUD COMPUTING  
  SOFTWARE AS A SERVICE  
The Cloud, the Store, and 
Millions of Apps
Anders Fagerjord
The	1.5	million	apps	for	the	iPhone	can	be	used	
for thousands of purposes. Many are cloud-based 
services, even more are games and simple utilities. 
The idea of Software as a Service is to have one 
instance of a program running on a central server, 
and only one browser to access these programs. 
From	mobile	devices	it	is	more	effective	to	access	
services from apps than from browsers, meaning 
that every user will need many apps. Moreover, hard-
ware sensors are equally or more important to apps 
than cloud access. Rather than thinking of apps as 
software services, we should describe them as actors 
in a network where developers, users, and Apple’s 
hardware, programming environment and App Store 
are important parts.
“The Web is Dead” was the slogan that covered the entire front 
page of Wired in August, 2010. Mobile apps provide “simpler, 
sleeker services that just work,” editor Chris Anderson wrote 
(2010b). Tim O’Reilly responded that “it ’s the backend that 
matters,” pointing to the fact that popular services like Twitter, 
Google, or Facebook are run in large server centres which can be 
reached from web sites and native apps alike (Anderson 2010a). 
These servers, called the cloud, are used by many of the most 
popular apps. We store our documents and data in the cloud, 
sometimes sharing it in social networks, sometimes keeping it 
private. They are available to us from any screen we use, from the 
little telephone and the mid­sized tablet to the desktop computer 
and even the 50­inch TV screen. We still call them telephones and 
TVs, but we use them for the same services. It is the cloud, the 
backend, that matters, it seems.
Parts of the cloud, or some clouds to be more precise, are 
Software as a Service (SaaS) sites, where users can access 
computer systems running in central data centres. Instead of 
installing the software on their own machines, users access the 
systems through a web page. In my university, I file my travel 
expenses in one web site, read and write formal correspondence 
in another, and write drafts of papers with colleagues in Google 
Docs, which is also a web site. All are accessible from a thin client, 
my Web browser. As the thin client already is in my computer 
(and virtually all other computers) I only need to keep that one 
program up to date, and do not need to install and upgrade a 
lot of others. It is presumably easier for me, and it saves the 
university’s computer department the work with purchasing 
upgrades and distributing them to all employees. The main 
system exists in only one instalment in the data centre, and may 
be updated at any time, without the need to distribute copies to 
all users. 
Most of the time, however, I find that the web sites are slow and 
generally difficult to use. I often long for “simpler, sleeker services 
that just work,” to borrow Anderson’s words once more.
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software via a Web browser, mobile platforms are used without 
the browser, instead favoring a myriad of native apps. We will 
untangle this somewhat in the following, and realize early that 
the cloud is a nice, simple metaphor for a complex actor network. 
A short essay like this can hardly treat one network, let alone 
several competing networks, so I will focus on apps made for 
Apple’s iOS, running on iPhones and iPads.
To describe a complex network like this, we need to be careful 
in the use of words, especially as a term may be understood 
differently by different sets of actors.
For a programmer, an app is an abbreviation for any application 
program. Here, we will use app as in a more restricted sense, 
which we believe is more in line with everyday language: an app is 
a small program for a mobile device, downloaded from a central 
distributor, an app store.
The term service is crucial for a book on SaaS. Here, we will have 
to move away from the everyday understanding of service, 
and limit it to the use within Service-oriented Architecture (SOA)
engineering, as defined by The Open Group: 
A service is a logical representation of a repeatable business 
activity that has a specified outcome (e.g., check customer 
credit, provide weather data, consolidate drilling reports, 
etc.) and: is self­contained, may be composed of other 
services, is a ‘black box’ to consumers of the service. (The 
Open Group 2013)
It should be added that these services are made available over 
a computer network. Are apps made of services, being just thin 
clients, gateways to the clouds? The truth is that some are, but far 
from all. To understand apps, we need to realize they are actors 
in a network that we will try to describe in the following. 
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Sweeping generalisations about apps are common, but an app 
can be most anything, from simple a utility to a complex game. 
Apple’s App Store contains map applications, medical diagnostic 
tools, exercise journals, recipe books and diet journals, banking 
apps and bus ticket apps, unit converters, calculators and the 
simple flashlight. The only common aspect seems to be the 
device: Apps are software applications for mobile devices. Let us 
then begin the description of the app networks with the iPhone 
itself. 
When the iPhone was introduced, Apple announced it as three 
new devices combined: An e­mail device, a music player, and a 
phone (Apple 2007). We may still tend to think of the iPhone as 
a remediation (Bolter and Grusin 1999) of the telephone, but the 
technical specification of an iPhone makes it very clear that it is 
much more. It is a pocket­sized computer with several network 
connections: GSM telephony, 801.11 Wi­fi, Bluetooth, USB, and in 
the 2014 models even Near­Field Communication (Apple 2014a).
Input can be given via the high­resolution touch screen, a 
microphone and camera on both the front and the back the 
phone, and a few buttons. Output is given through the screen, 
three loudspeakers, a vibrator, or a powerful LED light, and 
more loudspeakers and screens can be connected with wires. 
It is important not to forget the sensors: GPS, proximity sensor, 
barometer, an accelerometer, a three­way gyroscope for compass 
and movement, an ambient light sensor, and a fingerprint 
scanner in some models.
An iPhone app is a small program that uses some of these net­
work connections, input/output and sensors for a purpose the 
user finds useful or entertaining. An app can make calculations, 
based on input from the user or the sensors, send and receive 
data over a network, and output the results to the user, and 
simultaneously send the results over a network. The most 
95popular apps are in fact thin clients for Web services, such as 
Facebook and Google Maps. They use the network extensively, 
and most calculations are performed on the remote server, “in 
the cloud”. But other popular apps, for example Angry Birds, 
perform calculations on the iPhone, and use the touch screen 
and the loudspeakers of the iPhone for interaction. Yet other 
apps rely on other sensors, such as Sleep Cycle which uses the 
accelerometer to monitor how the users move while sleeping, 
or VitalSigns which calculates the pulse and breathing rate of 
the person in front of the camera by analysing the image. The 
2014 Apple Design Award winner Device 6 is an interactive story 
midway between a game and a book, using only the touch screen 
and the loudspeakers, while Flashlight uses only the touch screen 
to switch the LED flash on and off. Sleep Cycle, VitalSigns, Device 
6, and Flashlight do not communicate with any server, they run in 
isolation on the iPhone.
To state that there is no software, only services, would be to 
narrow down this multitude to only a few kinds of apps. I find 
Liestøl’s perspective more fruitful: That we are moving into the 
age of sensory media (Liestøl et al. 2012). I believe this transition 
needs to be studied extensively, but for this essay, we need to 
move on in our description of the network; from the apps running 
on the device to the app developers and the environment they 
work in.
Here be Software
Kittler received some attention for the provocative article title 
“There is no Software” (Kittler 1992), where he argues the many 
layers of computer software are only masking the underlying 
hardware of the computer. In all its technological determinism, 
the article is mainly a critique of modern computers’ Cartesian 
foundation. Kittler could code in several programming languages, 
and knew very well that software is the quite tangible result of 
labour, often tremendous labour. Its layered structure makes this 
96 labour more efficient, and instead of analysing it away, a software 
studies approach should focus on these different layers, and see 
how power is distributed throughout. 
One does not design an app by combining web services. Apps for 
iOS can only be made with Apple’s XCode programming environ­
ment for Macintosh computers. It includes two languages and 
70 different frameworks programmers can draw on, including 
interface buttons and other elements, cloud storage in Apple’s 
server parks, a database system, graphics engines for 2D and 
3D development, and interfaces to other parts of iOS, such as 
notifications, address book, calendar, maps, camera, and photo 
editing software. These frameworks are similar to services both 
in being standardised design patterns that developers can rely on 
through a relatively simple interface, and in being “black boxes”, 
as developers do not need to understand their inner workings. 
There are frameworks to support all the three main operations 
we outlined above; local calculations, access to the sensors , 
and access to Apple’s cloud services. Programmers may earn 
money by using Apple’s frameworks for purchases within the app 
through App Store’s payment service, and for banner ads inside 
the app. Cloud storage in Apple’s iCloud is available through 
another framework, and sharing via Facebook and Twitter is done 
via yet another.
XCode is a powerful actor in the network: It regulates what can 
be done, what is simple to do, and what simply can’t be done, 
and thus has power over its developers. Zittrain uses the iPhone 
as a prime example of a “tethered” device that can be remotely 
controlled by its manufacturers, in opposition to a “generative” 
device that can be made to do anything (Zittrain 2008, chap. 2–3). 
This division is too simple. Apple can control some aspects of 
iPhones through software updates, and some of the frameworks 
and services that developers may use can be remotely controlled. 
Developers have still found the freedom to create 1.5 million apps 
available in the US store, which seems quite generative. Apple’s 
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less resistance. Large corporations like Facebook operate their 
own services that their apps use. Smaller developers will have 
to develop their own services, or they can take the simpler route 
and use Apple’s. Rather than using a dichotomy of generative/
tethered, we should follow Kittler’s example (if not his con­
clusions) and study the degrees of freedom available through the 
software layers.
Software as a Service is often pictured as an architecture that 
makes programming simple. Apparently, developers do not 
need to code, just assemble different services, like a child con­
necting Lego bricks. Programming for iOS programming is a far 
way from this. Just to create the traditional beginners’ “hello 
world” message requires a list of different files, most of which 
are unintelligible for a beginner. 500 million iPhones have been 
sold (Costello 2014), only 350 000 of the owners have registered 
as developers, and many of these developers (we do not know 
how many) have never uploaded an app to App Store. One could 
imagine a phone so easy to program that users would create 
a flashlight app, not download one, but the iPhone is not that 
product.
App Store: The Obligatory Passage Point
Just as XCode is the only programming environment, Apple has 
a monopoly on distribution; developers can’t just send apps to 
their friends. To test a new app on an actual iPhone, the devel­
oper must purchase a $99 per year license from Apple (Apple 
2014b). The app can be tested on a few devices only, and can only 
be distributed further via Apple’s App Store. This  is the main 
node in the iOS network we are describing, and what Callon (1986) 
would describe as an “obligatory passage point.”
App Store contained close to 1.5 million apps at the end of 2014. 
It is a place for small businesses, as discussed by Snickars (2012) 
98 and Flueckiger (2012), although major services power the most 
popular apps (App Annie). 
Apple reviews every app before it is allowed into the App Store, 
and the “App Store Review Guidelines” (Apple 2015) contain 179 
rules. Apple controls that apps are reliable, safe, and consis­
tent with the iPhone interface guidelines. Apple also protects its 
market position, and “apps or metadata that mentions the name 
of any other mobile platform will be rejected” (rule 3.1). Violence, 
racism, sex, medical advice and mentions of drug, alcohol, or 
nicotine use are all strictly governed. This has spurred a debate 
on censorship, as witnessed by the Wikipedia page “Censorship 
by Apple” (Wikipedia contributors 2015). 
Apple collects a fee for every review. Approved apps can be dis­
tributed for free, or the developer can choose to sell it, in which 
case Apple keeps 30 percent of the revenue. To download an 
app, users must submit their private Apple ID and password, and 
charge paid apps to the credit card associated with the account.
Apple is by far the strongest power in these meetings with devel­
opers, software, registration fees and credit card companies, 
these “trials of strength” (Latour 1988). Developers also have 
power, however. The iPhone had not been the success it is 
without this tremendous creativity on the part of the developers, 
as Snickars (2012) has shown. Users on their side judge, one by 
one, which apps they want to install and use, which is no small 
power, as the competition for downloads is strong. When users 
choose which apps to keep, they arbitrate in the trials of strength 
between the other actors.
Mobility and Ubiquity: Clients and Clouds
We have drawn a quick sketch of the app network, indicating 
some power relations. We now can return to the question of 
SaaS. App development is not mashing up services by the inex­
perienced. Still, apps may connect to Facebook, Twitter, Google’s 
99many services, and personal storage clouds like Evernote or 
DropBox. This is ubiquitous computing: Your data is always with 
you; the clouds are always over your head. But the idea of the 
one thin client for all software is lost. Although the mobile phone 
is powerful it is too slow for the advanced client­side scripts 
that modern web services use. Mobile telephony networks 
are also much slower than broadband connections in desktop 
computers. Efficiency is a major reason to create an app rather 
than using the telephone’s web browser. Apple’s Objective­c is 
more efficient than JavaScript, and gives the developer more con­
trol over the many software frameworks and hardware sensors. 
Another reason is the tiny screen: The browser has a few lines of 
user interface (known as “chrome”) that eat up precious space. 
Facebook on the Safari browser is shown with the address bar on 
top and the back button and other controls on the bottom. The 
Facebook app can use the whole screen, and is at the same time 
more efficient.
Cloud computing on the phone is not one, but many thin clients. 
Each of these must be installed and kept up to date, and while the 
App Store software can notice users of available updates, SaaS's 
main promise of no installs, no upgrades is lost.
Conclusion
Apps will not kill the Web. While there are some overlaps between 
web sites and apps, there is a considerable number of apps that 
never have been, and never will be web services. Anderson’s 
point is that a lot of what is now available as commercial services 
on the web, such as news and social media, can be delivered 
more efficiently and reliably on apps tailor­made for each plat­
form. It should not be a surprise that the media industry is what 
is most visible from Anderson’s perspective as an editor of a print 
magazine. Amateur participation is for Zittrain and others the 
strength of the Web, and the one aspect that makes it a unique 
technology.
100 Amateurs make many apps, but most apps are probably made by 
professional programmers in their spare time. To create an app 
is to enter a network of, Apple’s programming languages and the 
Xcode application, Apple’s approval service, Apple’s App Store, 
users, and the iPhone itself. 
Apps are more than services, they are applications that put the 
iPhone’s computing facilities, network connections, sensors and 
output devices to use for purposes that do not provoke Apple, 
and that users find meaningful. 
I would like to thank Anders Sundnes Løvlie, Frode Guribye, 
Kjartan Michalsen, and Johannes M. Ringheim for insightful 
discussions. The Department of Media and Information Science, 
University of Bergen kindly lent me the office space where I wrote 
this text.
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Denials of Service
Jussi Parikka
This article addresses denial-of-service attacks as 
one key entry point to understanding contemporary 
issues in network politics. By way of underlining the 
spiraling feature of the Internet economy as based 
on security and attack services, it leads into dis-
cussing	the	December	2014	DoS	attack	against	Sony	
and Xbox gaming networks which were resolved 
by	Kimdotcom	offering	the	hackers	vouchers	for	
his	file-sharing	service,	Mega.	The	article	considers	
the implications of this and other examples in the 
context of how service has also come to denote a 
relationship to Internet infrastructure: Servers and 
the speed of Internet connections that can be slowed 
down	or	flooded	by	way	of	denial-of-service	attacks.
Assumed Service
Service can be considered a general term that designates one 
major axis of network politics. Software is a service on so many 
levels. It is, after all, under the rubric of service that one enters 
into platforms and their terms of use; is granted or denied access 
to content such as newspapers, media or other things behind 
a paywall; gets connected on social networks such as gaming 
network and other forms of fun that, too, are a service. As by 
the end of this short text becomes clear, denial-of-services (DoS) 
are also services—and they can also be tackled with the further 
provision of service vouchers. The software­based economy is 
one of competing services whether we are talking of the official 
platforms such as social media or the more informal, sometimes 
criminal, services such as DoS. 
Service also implies key cognitive and social skills as the site of 
extracting value and monetisation. It is, after all, in the service 
economy that services are effectively invented as ways of 
accessing your needs, relations and other forms in which value 
might be discovered. The social is not merely about the factory, 
as we learned in the post­Fordist political theory; the social is 
also a service as long as one is able to package it as such. In other 
words, in the contemporary social media and service economy, 
the social is accessed as a service.
Besides being a nexus of such relations, where the social and 
the economic conflate, one can approach service through 
another link. In terms of technological culture and technological 
(media) systems, one can follow in the footsteps of Paul Virilio 
and Wolfgang Schivelbusch in starting to track the nature of 
technological systems through their breaking points. With the 
invention of the train comes the train wreck, the history of 
aviation is one of a systematic relation to the air craft accidents 
and similarly across a range of technological inventions, one can 
write the history of their specific accidents. One can write the 
media archaeology of technology through its breaking points and 
105analyze how, for example, computers, software and networks 
such as the Internet, look if one starts from their specific forms 
of accidents. One can claim that computer worms and viruses 
have been one such central form of an accident that unfolds the 
wider logic and implicit infrastructural desires of network culture 
in relation to universal communicability, exchange and sharing 
(Parikka 2007; Cohen 1986). This suggests that one can also 
address the issue of services from the perspective of denial­of 
service attacks, one recurring/repetitive form of software­based 
practice that has been coined both as a new form of new political 
activism and as much as harmful hacking.
Through DoS activities, the idea of services as the mask of 
software becomes one related to security and commerce. 
In short, denial­of­service attacks have become part of the 
vocabulary of media reports and security evaluation of Internet 
culture since the latter half of the 1990s. In simple, rather non­
technical terms, denial­of­service attacks work by bombarding a 
specific address and its server. The Internet economy of “pings” 
and “hits” is turned against itself by a technically­induced surge 
in “popularity” over a short period of time, causing the server to 
crash and become unavailable. The whole attack has a curious 
relation to the time of the Internet “pings” (see Pias 2011) and the 
time­critical infrastructure of the Internet (Ernst 2013) in terms 
of producing a request time out; or in other words, producing 
a situation of technical inability to handle requests (being 
flooded, a situation of service desk management under extreme 
customer inflow, so to speak). Situations of bureaucracy and 
customer service turn into problems of Internet traffic and its 
protocological management, just like social situations of services 
and servantry have turned into both symbolic signs and cultural 
techniques of the software search economy (Krajewski 2010). 
Software turns around the axis of service, whether providing or 
denying service. 
106 Cultural Techniques of Denial
As writers such as Finn Brunton (2013) have explained, DoS 
or distributed-denial-of service (DDoS) attacks using botnets, 
are a feature of the history of malicious software. As early as 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, dangers of worms and viruses 
were identified in the context of commercial transactions, 
communication and services. Security measures extended 
to insurance with Lloyds of London in 1989 already offering 
packages for network­related incidents. The policy was to cover 
against loss of telecommunications, software and data faults, 
as well as virus attacks. Around the same period, Control Risks 
Group Ltd. formed a new company called Control Risks Infor­
mation Technology Ltd. (CRIT), which was tasked with combatting 
computer crime, including espionage, fraud, malicious or illegal 
data modification, and denial­ or destruction­of­services (Parikka 
2007, 73). In the unending spiral of the service economy, this situ­
ation refers to a service to cover against loss of service.
Worms such as Mydoom (2004) and many others have become 
milestones in this alternative history of the Internet service 
economy (read through its underbelly). However, the various 
cultural techniques of actually denying a service, are even 
more abundant, including smurfing and fraggling as ways to 
enforce bandwidth consumption, ICMP (Internet Control Message 
Protocol) echo request/reply pinging, and even by sending single 
malicious packets such as the Invite of Death attacks using the 
Internet telephony protocol (VoIP). Such techniques relate to the 
protocological nature of the Internet (Galloway 2004) but also 
open up as specific ways of emphasizing the issue of service over 
software. Of course, when it comes to issues of service and their 
denials, through a DoS perspective one starts to appreciate how 
even zombie networks of bots are part and parcel in the for­
mation of the service relations of Internet platforms. A thousand 
captured machines pinging your favorite games service network 
is the call of the half­dead slowing down your bandwidth. 
107This primacy of service and its denial is an interesting feature in 
terms of software­related techniques. Indeed, it is one way of 
beginning the task of unfolding the peculiar emphasis on Internet 
sociability as one of relations of service. For there to be denial­
of­service, an assumption of service has to be established as one 
prime feature of the social digital networks and its platforms. 
The discourse of services is actually a way of starting to consider 
whether, instead of software, the issues highlighted and at the 
centre of this sort of Internet “politics” are ones of servers, not 
software; of data traffic and speeds, not programs? Naturally one 
should not consider these things as binary opposites, but when 
referring to software politics, software studies, and other related 
terms, one has to remember that not all of the software focus 
refers back to end user programs, but the wider infrastructural 
questions and their service relations which sustain the specific 
modes of subjectivity in network economies: servers, servants, 
services and their customers (see Krajewski 2010 and 2013 for a 
thorough media history of servantry).
It is in this context, that the relation of service to “network pol­
itics” is emphasized with a twist. The service­induced bracketing 
of software—there is no software, only services—is a feature that 
can be addressed by way of analyzing the logic of DoS and service 
as a feature negotiated as part of Internet infrastructure: servers, 
bandwidth, slowness and speeds of pings, etc. Services offer 
access to content, but are also underpinned by how such content 
and the affective/cognitive economy is reliant on infrastructure. 
Over the past years, issues of net neutrality have dictated a major 
chunk of the debate on network politics: who is allowed to dictate 
Internet speeds, potential offering a fast lane to the best paying 
services over less wealthy users?
DoS offers a further commentary as to the speed and slowness 
as services. One can even buy this slowing down as a service 
by way of hiring suitable hacker groups (Brunton 2013; Dredge 
2014), just like one is offered services of “neighborhood watch” 
of distributed webmasters, data management and distributed 
108 clouds to ensure the accessibility of your site even for individuals 
or small groups/companies (e. g. CloudFlare 2015). Security 
services extend from mere protection against malicious software 
to encompass visitor management, content distribution across 
servers, and traffic optimization.
In any case, all of this illuminates the various levels at which 
service operates from the service one buys and assumes in terms 
of content, feeling, user satisfaction and such end­user customer 
contexts, but also the infrastructural level involved in a network 
relation: for example, the assumed speed.
Voucher Solutions
As an example of the curious twists of the discourse of service 
and denial­of­service in Internet culture, consider this example 
from the end of 2014. During the Christmas holidays in 2014, on 
Boxing Day, the hacker group Lizard Squad claimed responsibility 
for a denial­of­service attack on the Sony Playstation and Xbox 
networks. In the middle of the post­Christmas gaming frenzy, 
the attack brought down the networks, making headlines as the 
hacking incidents had done earlier in December. The alleged 
North Korean hacking of Sony reached an odd consumer­cen­
tred “political” debate about censorship as it looked like Sony 
would pull its film The Interview from distribution. Of course, the 
Sony hack by the group Guardians of Peace focused primarily on 
capturing a wealth of material from Sony and was different to the 
Lizard Squad attack.
In a manner that also provides a curious commentary on the 
notion of network politics, the Lizard Squad situation was 
resolved by a very surprising mediator, Kimdotcom, the con­
troversial founder of Megaupload, the Mega storage/sharing 
service and a vocal Internet rights and freedoms activist. 
According to his own testimony, the hackers were offered 
vouchers for premium Mega Lifetime accounts in exchange 
for ending the attack and promising never to do it again. 
109The situation was resolved with both sides releasing Twitter 
statements.
Lizard Squad (@lizardmafia) commented in a very satisfied tone: 
“Thanks @KimDotcom for the vouchers­­you’re the reason 
we stopped the attacks. @MegaPrivacy is an awesome 
service.” 
The happy tone was echoed by Kimdotcom on Twitter: “Xbox Live 
and PSN services coming back. Many regions fully restored. 
Full recovery imminent. Enjoy your gaming holidays. You’re 
welcome :­)” 
Later on the same day, December 26, 2014, “Remember... Lizard 
Squad only gets the benefit of free Mega premium accounts 
if they don’t attack Xbox Live & PSN again. #Thatsthedeal”. 
This did not, however, stop Lizard Squad from offering their 
services as a separate DDoS­tool called the LizardStresser that 
one could hire for Internet attack needs: “LizardStresser’s highest 
level of attack promises 30,000 seconds—just over eight hours—
for $129.99 a month or $500 for for ‘lifetime’ usage” (Dredge 2014).
Besides DDoS as a service, the case of the Mega storage/sharing 
platform is also a curious commentary on the Internet economy. 
As part of the new vanguard of Internet hero sort of politics 
of individual cult­producing freedom fighters (alongside, for 
example, Julian Assange) Kimdotcom’s politics­accused­of­piracy 
has turned to quoting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
on the home page of the storage/sharing platform Mega, branded 
as 
The Privacy Company: No one shall be subjected to arbi­
trary interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence. Everyone has the right to the protection of 
law against such interference. (Mega 2015a) 
Storage and privacy become part and parcel of their business, or 
more specifically, as specified in Mega’s Terms of Service:
110 Our service includes UCE [user controlled encryption]. You 
should keep your encryption keys safe and confidential and 
not release them to anyone unless you wish them to have 
access to your data. If you lose or misplace your encryption 
keys, you will lose access to your data. We strongly urge you 
to use robust anti­virus and firewall protection. (Mega 2015b)
Significantly, as hacking and related techniques have been 
adopted as part of the discourse of network politics over the 
past years, it can also refer to a service­oriented “politics” or 
“diplomacy” that counters denials­of­service with access to 
service. Kimdotcom’s offer (#thatsthedeal), counters the hacker 
actions by a Christmas gift of free encrypted storage vouchers 
ensuring access to gaming network services for millions of 
users. The culture of vouchers, from shopping and even the 
privatization of service economies in the wake of austerity 
policies, signify the ability to choose to be cherished by neoliberal 
discourse. 
Anyhow, in our case, it marks a variation of “there is no software, 
there are just services” to “there is no software, just vouchers”—a 
quasi­political service­oriented solution to problems of 
denials­of­service.
Many thanks to Geraldine Juárez for her feedback and ideas. 
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